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Abstract
A political close-reading of Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein as viewed in light of
Thomas Hobbes’ political and moral theory as he presented it in Leviathan. This thesis
argues that Hobbesian contract theory has been neglected as an effective lens for political
interpretations of gothic literature in general, and shows explicitly how Hobbesian
thought features in Frankenstein. Hobbes’ significance to arguments surrounding the
French Revolution and human conflict in general is explored with a focus on the political
theories of Edmund Burke, Thomas Paine, Mary Wollstonecraft and William Godwin,
followed by an examination of the political significance of settings in Frankenstein. The
study proceeds with an in-depth look at Hobbes’ contributions to the political theory of
Shelley’s closest influences, and concludes with a Hobbesian reading of Frankenstein
according to Leviathan.
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Chapter One
Churchyards and Charnel Houses
In the opening chapters of Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein or The Modern
Prometheus (1818) a young Victor Frankenstein discovers to his amazement that an
ancient tree on his family property is “utterly destroyed” by lightning (Shelley 24), an
anomaly that he claims abolishes his interest in the alchemical works of philosophers like
Paracelsus and Cornelius Agrippa (25). However, his childhood fantasies of resurrecting
the dead (24) and rendering the human frame impervious to death (23) come back to him
in adulthood, and ultimately inspire his experiments to “bestow animation upon lifeless
matter [and]… renew life where death had apparently devoted the body to corruption”
(36). The use of new science to achieve ancient ambitions proves that, although he claims
that the alchemists have been dethroned as the “lords of [his] imagination” (25),Victor is
still as influenced by them as ever, and this influence is the fuel that propels him beyond
the achievements of his contemporaries. The scenario is also fitting to describe Shelley’s
composition Frankenstein, which was written in a period of revolution and
democratization that threatened to write out the ancient political systems of Europe.
Shelley’s description of the monster’s piecemeal construction parallels the compilation of
the ideas of Burke, Paine, Rousseau, Godwin, Wollstonecraft and Percy Bysshe Shelley
in her novel. Shelley constructs her novel, the best new medium to bring political theory
to the masses (Rivlin-Beenstock 154), from the bones of their arguments and animates
them altogether as the framework for her own philosophy, characterized by a blend of
new radical thinking and antiquated conservative systems. Shelley uses the images and
theories of Thomas Hobbes much like Victor is inspired by the alchemical origins of
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scientific inquiry, and uses his theories as a platform to “[emphasize] her conservative
character in contrast to that of her radical family” (182).
Although perfectly suited to even a simple comparative analysis, there is an
underwhelming amount of critical scholarship that discusses both Mary Shelley’s
Frankenstein and the political or moral philosophy of Thomas Hobbes as laid out in
Leviathan, or The Matter, Forme and Power of a Common Wealth Ecclesiasticall and
Civil (1651) or any of his other works. Hobbes’ political theories are concerned with the
natural and logical organization of power in a state under the assumption that, left to their
own devices, men are naturally self-serving and violent. His argument that a social
contract results in a fair, strong, unimpeachable “artificial man” (Hobbes 7) is a perfect
political frame for the struggle for power between Victor Frankenstein and the monster.
There is an obvious parallel between a monarch who has been granted unreasonable
power by his subjects and a creature built to be superior to natural men that becomes
something dreadful to them. Aside from cursory references to Hobbes, most literary
critics of Frankenstein neglect Hobbes’ political theory and imagery entirely; the political
analyses of Frankenstein that do exist suggest that the philosophers of the French
Revolution have, by virtue of their proximity in time and significance to the author,
outshone Hobbes as a possible analytical frame. Hobbes’ “leviathan” has been replaced
by “Montesquieu’s troglodytes and Burke’s ghosts and goblins” (Devetak 631). As a
result there has been critical silence concerning Hobbes’ place in Frankenstein.
The relevance of Hobbes to Shelley has been hitherto little explored, with the few
notable exceptions that follow later in this chapter. There is an abundance of criticism on
political theorists like Burke, Paine, and Rousseau that overlaps with Shelley’s novel
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because her parents responded to and/or knew each author personally. As a result, these
thinkers had a great deal of influence on Godwin and Wollstonecraft’s philosophy, and
by extension Shelley’s. As they passed on their philosophy to their daughter through their
writings, Shelley responded to her parents’ works in Frankenstein and as a result she
responds to the political philosophers that influenced them as well.

While the effect of philosophers like Rousseau and Godwin on Frankenstein has been
keenly documented by authors like Chris Baldick, Colene Bentley, Sylvia Bowerbank,
David Marshall, Ronald Paulson and Diana Reese, the influence of Hobbes’
philosophical model has been neglected. Hobbes’ political theory, as set out in Leviathan,
is one of the models that deserve a closer look on the basis of its role as a precursor to
Rousseau, Burke, and Paine. One reason that Shelley has not been read in light of
Hobbesian philosophy is that scholarship in the last thirty years has been influenced by
John Burrow, who argued that “virtually nobody in nineteenth-century England… had
employed a conception of human nature or… ‘man in society’ in terms closely derived
from the philosophy of Thomas Hobbes” (Ghosh and Goldman 237). The main reason
that Hobbes does not figure more prominently in the political conversation of Shelley’s
contemporaries is that in the period leading up to the French Revolution his theories were
out of vogue in Britain, criticized for their “a-theistic” qualities (Ross, Schneider and
Waldman 124), his “unique interpretations of scripture, materialism, and his unrelenting
Erastianism” (102). Hobbes’ works were all but banned after the Restoration (Martel 4)
and “knowledge of Hobbes’s life and thought… disappeared from the mainstream of
intellectual debate in Britain for well over a century” (Ghosh and Goldman 239). Many
English scholars in the Victorian era ignored Hobbes altogether, or addressed his work as
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“part of the wider explosion of interest in seventeenth-century history” (237). However,
Hobbes retained currency on the continent, where copies of De Cive were translated into
“Dutch, Russian, Swiss and French” followed by translations of Leviathan after 1790
(239). Yet, despite the “continued taint of despotism and blasphemy” that hung over his
work in Britain, some English writers still commented on Hobbes “without attribution”
(240), and in the later-half of the nineteenth century his work finally began receiving
more attention.
Hobbes’ political opus Leviathan led to “charges of atheism and treason” that coloured
his reputation well after his death, and the work was nearly banned by parliament
following Charles II’s return to the throne in 1660 (Martel 4). Even without official
action against him, popular opinion of Leviathan was that it was “the gospel of coldheaded and hard-hearted unbelievers” and Hobbes himself was called “a supporter of
tyranny… and turncoat” which led to Hobbes and his political philosophy all but
vanishing from England’s political landscape (Ghosh and Goldman 239). The same
material that inspired accusations of atheism and materialism in Hobbes’ lifetime were,
ironically, also why Leviathan attracted more interest after the French Revolution (240).
The violent response of Burke and other defenders of the British monarchy to the
“mechanic philosophy” of the philosophes and Jacobins undoubtedly renewed some
interest in Hobbes’ highly mechanistic works (Brantlinger 53). Many of the same
accusations of “political radicalism and implicit atheism” were levelled against William
Godwin as well, despite the popular reception of his 1793 Enquiry Concerning Political
Justice and its Influence on Morals and Happiness (Weston 2). For this reason there is
little written about Hobbes in this period, although the anonymous author of the 1790
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pamphlet Observations on the Reflections of the Right Honourable Edmund Burke, on the
Revolution in France (believed to be one Mrs. Macaulay Graham), was quoted in Joseph
Johnson’s Analytical Review as saying that “[Burke’s] system is shewn to be even more
illiberal than that of Mr. Hobbes, and peculiarly adapted to corrupt the minds and
dispositions of those in authority” (“Book Review” 419). This representation of Hobbes’
political philosophy in the left-wing Analytical Review illustrates the demonized position
he held as an advocate of the far right among thinkers like Godwin and Wollstonecraft,
who were part of Johnson’s circle (Fennessy 224). Despite the disdain radical thinkers
expressed towards Hobbes’ political philosophy in 1790, it was among this group that an
appetite for Hobbes’ thinking was building towards a revival in the Victorian era, as
“individual works by Hobbes slowly began to re-appear, initially from back-street
printing houses on the radical fringes of the debate in the wake of 1789” (Ghosh and
Goldman 240). The first major reappearance of Hobbes in England would come in 1812
with a re-printing of On Human Nature and Of Liberty and Necessity followed by
Behemoth two years later, and a series of lectures by William Hazlitt, “whose popular
lectures at the Russell institution were the conduit by which Hobbes’s life and thought
would become better known among a wider metropolitan audience, including Coleridge,
James Mill, and other philosophical radicals” (240). As unlikely as it would seem given
his conservatism, Hobbes’ revival in popularity was facilitated by the “advanced radical
democrats and critics of state power” of the era (243), mostly in appreciation of his work
in the theoretical areas of “mind, logic, language, sensation, and scientific method” (243245). At this time, a reputation as an atheist and materialist undoubtedly worked in
Hobbes’ favour among intellectuals. Admittedly, “it was… extremely rare for Victorian
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readers of Hobbes to endorse or condemn his system on every front,” but the men who
brought his ideas back into common usage “were willing to pardon ‘his services to
Despotism’ in consideration of ‘his services to philosophy’” and included, among other
radical thinkers of note, Mary Shelley’s father William Godwin (244). Jose Harris states
that it was “these fierce critics of Hanoverian government who first brought Hobbes’s
name back into circulation” (244), and that “Godwin’s novel [Things as They Are; or,
Caleb Williams (1794)] was designed to demonstrate how Hobbes’s account of
mechanical interplay… governed even the minutest relations of everyday life” (245).
Caleb Williams, a novel that Godwin himself identified “as continuous with Political
Justice,” written in the hopes of bringing his political theory to the masses, raises
questions about the effectiveness of social and “political institutions such as marriage,
government and the social contract” (Rivlin-Beenstock 154). Godwin even based the
antagonist of the novel “on the figure and philosophy of Edmund Burke” (Davison 124)
to whose Reflections he had responded in Political Justice (121). It was to the “Author of
Political Justice, Caleb Williams, & c.” that Shelley dedicated Frankenstein.
Many elements of Frankenstein, including its contemporary setting (123), doubled
hero-villain (124), “forbidden knowledge” (125), and justice system that persecutes the
innocent (126), are borrowed from Caleb Williams. One interpretation of Frankenstein
even claims, according to Chris Baldick, “Victor Frankenstein [is a] satirical
representation of William Godwin” (Baldick 27). Shelley’s novel can be read “as a
development of Godwin’s critique of Rousseau, and arguably the most powerful
Romantic indictment of the social contract tradition” and uses the image of the creature
being composed of parts as “an allegory of the ills of individualism, and of consequent
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social breakdown” (Rivlin-Beenstock 25). Shelley further uses her novel to interrogate
her father’s “individualism” as it “sanctions a culture based on exclusions,” and makes
her own case for inclusivity by illustrating the evils that come from the creature’s
disenfranchisement (180); Shelley makes a strong case that “the group, rather than the
solitary individual, should be the foundational social unit” (181) and uses the creature to
“[allegorize] social contract theory’s failure to unite individuals into a society” as the
creature itself “embodies the ills of excessive individualism” enshrined in Godwin’s
Political Justice (181).
Very little has been written to date on the relationship between Shelley’s Frankenstein
and Hobbes’ Leviathan. In the introduction to the Oxford World’s Classics Frankenstein
(1818) Marilyn Butler cites Steven Shapin and Simon Schaffer’s Leviathan and the AirPump: Hobbes, Boyle, and the Experimental Life (1985) to explain the distinction
between the nature of “pre-professional medieval-Renaissance science” which was
“personal, secretive, [and] implicated in dangerous magic,” and “Enlightenment
laboratory-science,” which was characterized by transparency and the advancement of the
human understanding in a “public, officially sanctioned space” (Butler xxx).
Unfortunately, Shapin and Schaffer’s book makes no reference to Shelley or
Frankenstein and did not lead Butler to explore how Hobbes might be used as an
interpretive lens for Frankenstein.
Loralea Michaelis’ 2007 article “Hobbes's Modern Prometheus: A Political
Philosophy for an Uncertain Future” does mention both Hobbes’ Leviathan and the
creature from Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein. The article focusses on the preoccupation of
Hobbes’ philosophy with the acquisitive nature of men, which she attributes to the
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anxiety men feel about providing for an uncertain future, and a sense of alienation from
the past (Michaelis 123). Michaelis addresses several Hobbesian arguments featured in
Shelley’s novel, including the inability of promises to regulate conduct (119), and the
inability of rational discourse to bring individuals to “agreement on matters of common
concern,” while it exaggerates “the different and variable desires” men have (118). The
article is framed almost entirely around Hobbes’ retelling of the story of Prometheus in
Leviathan, in which Hobbes neglects the events leading up to Prometheus’ punishment
(the focus of ancient renditions of the story) and solely concerns himself with the grim
future Prometheus “knows will bring him no relief” (102). Michaelis’ link between
Hobbes’ portrayal of Prometheus, modern anxieties about an uncertain future and the
growing need to “adapt quickly and effortlessly to change,” furnishes the title of the
article (101). In her conclusion, Michaelis compares Hobbes’ retelling of the Prometheus
story to Shelley’s “other modern Prometheus,” because just as Hobbes writes out
Prometheus’ past, the creature is alienated from his past by nature of his unnatural birth
(124). She also compares the creature’s “search for love” to the “search for security” that
Hobbes only admits possible under the control of an absolute ruler (124). Michaelis does
not maintain the analogy between Frankenstein and Hobbes’ Prometheus story
throughout her article. Her article is only linked to Frankenstein in the closing lines and
therefore her title does not reflect the degree of her engagement with Shelley’s text.
In In Frankenstein’s Shadow: Myth, Monstrosity, and Nineteenth-century Writing
(1987), Chris Baldick goes further in pointing out the association between Frankenstein
and Thomas Hobbes’ Leviathan. Baldick observes that the image of Shelley’s monster
and Hobbes’ “artificial man” “both reflect the dismemberment of the old body politic…
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[and] signal the growing awareness, hastened in the heat of regicide and revolution, of
destinies no longer continuous with nature” (Baldick 16). This statement not only
demonstrates how appropriately these works correspond as political event and exegesis,
but also how the imagery of Shelley’s novel emulates the political allegory of Hobbes’s
vision of the state being a manufactured creature “of greater stature and strength than the
Naturall [man]” (15). Even though Baldick discusses the Leviathan as an inspiration for
the physical shape and scale of Frankenstein’s monster, he never fully explores the
ramifications of reading Hobbes’ political philosophy directly into the creature (16).
Baldick’s observation potentially reverses the political reading of Frankenstein from the
creature being cast as poor, disadvantaged, and rebellious into a symbol of the powerful,
artificially constructed commonwealth that Hobbes describes in Leviathan. This
implication that the creature has the ability to stand for aspects of both the English Civil
War and the French Revolution, also demonstrates the versatility of Shelley’s novel as a
metaphor for civil conflict, or instances of violent political upheaval in general. Baldick
further associates the “uneasy feeling of human responsibility involved in [Hobbes’]
conception” of political organization with Frankenstein in a way that no one else has,
noting that government is a “monstrosity” imposing itself on the people who institute it,
and observing that “the monsters both of poetic fancy and political organization are made
not by nature but by fallible human arts” (15). This uncomfortable sense that man has
exceeded himself and created a force beyond his control has no greater representation in
the popular imagination than Frankenstein.
Baldick also connects the “prodigious proliferation of… ‘Gothic’ novels… [to] a
flurry of books and pamphlets provoked by Edmund Burke’s Reflections on the
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Revolution in France (1790)” and the “Politico-philosophical novels” of the Jacobinites
to the French Revolution (16). Baldick elegantly divides this literature into two camps of
horror: the Gothic, which is “preoccupied with feudal forms of unlimited personal power
and its tyrannical abuse” (16) and associated with “the spectres of Britain’s primitive,
superstitious, corrupt and tyrannical Catholic past” (Davison 25); and the new (mostly)
Anti-Jacobinite literature which draws from the anxieties of an uncertain future and the
fresh nightmares of the Revolution (Baldick 16). Baldick points to “the Jacobin Novel” as
the median between the two, as these works (including those by Shelley’s parents) “are
more openly addressed to the social and political issues highlighted by the revolutionary
process” (16). Hobbes’ political treatises also satisfy these requirements: from the
conservative perspective they approach an uncertain future as the “body politic” is
threatened by civil war (14), and the fear of superstitious Catholic influences is, for
Hobbes, a contemporary issue that he writes at length about in Leviathan. Richard
Devetak acknowledges both Hobbes and Frankenstein in his article “The Gothic Scene of
International Relations: Ghosts, Monsters, Terror and the Sublime after September 11”
(2005) and acknowledges that the “monsters, so central to gothic fictions, have also been
strange, albeit mostly unremarked, presences in political thought… [that] have helped
contribute to tenebrous political atmospheres” (Devetak 631). Unfortunately, Hobbes and
Frankenstein diverge in his subsequent analysis.
Zoe Rivlin-Beenstock’s 2010 dissertation The Social Contract and the Romantic
Canon: The Individual and Society in the Works of Wordsworth, Godwin and Mary
Shelley encapsulates both Hobbesian philosophy and the works of Godwin,
Wollstonecraft and Shelley, but does not link Hobbes and Frankenstein together. She
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examines Frankenstein almost exclusively through the lens of Rousseau’s gender politics,
and Hobbes is never mentioned in this context. However, Rivlin-Beenstock has brilliantly
analyzed Shelley’s own contributions to social contract philosophy, treating Shelley as a
theorist in her own right rather than only as an adjunct to her parents’ philosophical
contributions. Rivlin-Beenstock’s dissertation provides an over-arching review of social
compact theory. Starting with Hobbes as “the first canonical thinker…to suggest that
sociability needs to be created artificially by instating a sovereign,” Rivlin-Beenstock
traces the concept as it was modified by Locke and adapted by Rousseau who, according
to her footnotes, “is arguably the most directly influential social contract writer for the
Romantic canon” (29). Her overview charting social contract theory from Hobbes to
Rousseau, whose influence on Frankenstein is well-documented, shows that there is a
clear lineage of political thought from Hobbes to Shelley, whom Rivlin-Beenstock counts
as a noteworthy reformer who emphasizes the significance of group membership over
individualism (181).
While Rivlin-Beenstock’s dissertation connects Shelley to social contract theory
through Rousseau, her argument does not follow the political foundations of
Frankenstein from Rousseau back to Hobbes’ theory. My thesis is the first to trace these
foundations back far enough to expose the lineage of political thought from Thomas
Hobbes, to Paine, Burke and Shelley’s nearer contemporaries. I proceed to use Hobbes’
theory, as laid out in Leviathan, as the basis of a political close-reading of Shelley’s
novel, to show that her novel already embodies many of the ideas that supported his view
of absolute monarchy. I show that Shelley’s novel is emblematic of Hobbes’ thinking if
the novel is re-interpreted in a manner that reverses the conventional power dynamics of
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the text, valuing the creature for its composition and strength rather than viewing it as a
failed experiment or moral consequence of Victor’s ambition. This reading demonstrates
the extent to which Hobbesian political theory has been overlooked as an influence on
Frankenstein and that the reading of the novel is significantly enriched by directly
applying Hobbes’ political theory to the text; it also shows the diversity of the novel as a
frame for political conflict, and opens the way for more intertextual dialogue between
Hobbesian philosophy and Gothic literature.
Chapter two, “The Labours of Men of Genius” explores the influence of the
revolutionary political theory of Edmund Burke and Thomas Paine upon the novel. Burke
is of singular importance to the novel because his arguments in Reflections on the
Revolution in France (1790) affirm many of the views expressed by Hobbes, particularly
his support for an inherited monarchy; but more importantly because Burke inspired a
wave of political responses to his Reflections that supported the French Revolution
(Baldick 16), most notably those by Paine, Wollstonecraft, and Godwin. Were it not for
Burke there would arguably have been no Political Justice, Vindication of the Rights of
Woman, Caleb Williams and, most likely, no Frankenstein. Reflections itself is a
response to radical thinkers who argued that the French revolution bore a similarity to the
English Revolution of 1688 (Aldridge 136). Interestingly, these arguments coincided with
reprintings of Leviathan in continental Europe during the 1790s (239) where French
radical thinkers hailed Hobbes as “the true father of revolutionary philosophy” (Ghosh
and Goldman 241). Burke firmly denies any similarity between the Revolutions because
to do so would be admitting that England could be equally vulnerable to the fate of
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France, contrary to his legalistic faith in the “practical, tested methods” of aristocratic
rule and inherited powers (Aldridge 136).
The responses to Burke by Paine, Wollstonecraft, and Godwin support the
revolutionary cause and embody the radical thought of the age. The second chapter of this
work, “The Labours of Men of Genius” looks at their contributions to the political
conversation for the purpose of establishing the novel’s place in the political era of the
French Revolution. I identify places where Hobbes’ philosophical contributions were
either adopted or ignored by Burke or Paine and his fellow radicals, and where his
imagery applies, establishing Frankenstein as part of a political lineage from Hobbes to
Shelley’s contemporaries to prove that his ideas remained relevant even during a period
after his death when he was highly unpopular in Britain (Ghosh and Goldman 239-240).
The third chapter, “To Pursue History to Her Hiding Places” relates the novel’s
political imagery to the locations where the majority of the story arc takes place.
Following recent work by Fred V. Randel, whose article “The Political Geography of
Horror in Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein” (2003) fills a gap in the scholarship regarding
the historical significance of the locations of Frankenstein, this chapter looks at
Ingolstadt, Geneva, and Mont Blanc in relation to their social and political histories to
amplify a political reading of the novel. The goal of this chapter is not only to
demonstrate what these places mean to characters in the story, but to illustrate how
Shelley has enshrined historical events in her narrative. Randel notes that it is common
for “modern European novels” to pay homage to historical events associated with the
locations in which they are set (Randel 465). In a text as self-aware as Frankenstein, little
or nothing is included in the novel that does not either have personal relevance to the
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author (Shelley conceived the idea of the novel while staying near Geneva,
Frankenstein’s home, and travelled with Percy to Chamonix which furnished her scene
between Frankenstein and his monster on Mont Blanc) or a deeper cultural value (Butler
lix). Understanding what these locations mean either to Shelley, or her readers in Britain
and on the continent (De Cive and Decorpore Politico were translated in France in 1649
and 1652, respectively) is crucial to fully grasping the nuances of the book (Skinner 159160). Special attention is paid in this chapter to revolutionary activity between the
English Civil War and the French Revolution to explain significant differences between
the common reading of Frankenstein and a Hobbesian one.
As the child of renowned writers of political philosophy, Shelley herself is part of a
political dynasty. “[V]irtually all studies of Frankenstein acknowledge Godwin and
Wollstonecraft’s omnipresence” (Rivlin-Beenstock 184). While both her parents and her
husband “consistently defended the radical perspective” in their writings however,
Shelley blends these with her own “contradictory perspectives” in her novel (Bowerbank
418) and shows notable independent growth as a writer and political thinker between
1818 and the third edition of her novel in 1831 (Butler 199). The nature of the changes
Shelley made between editions show how her opinions changed as she matured (Oakes
66). Some of these changes are, in themselves, instances of rebellion; others are
monuments to the memory of her parents and husband as radical proponents of
revolution. As their arguments were typically levelled against patriarchic institutions, it
makes sense that the nature of rebellion in the novel is frequently figured as tension
between fathers and their children, the most basic unit of patriarchal hierarchy. RivlinBeenstock points out that Godwin is “surprisingly conservative,” in his writing and
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“sanctions a culture [of individualism] based on exclusions” where male society is
defined by disregarding women (Rivlin-Beenstock 180). As her only surviving parent,
Godwin is the primary analytical focus of chapter four. I compare Godwin’s ideas
concerning utility, necessity, and sociopolitical organization (and to a lesser-extent
Wollstonecraft’s) to Hobbes’ ideas where there are philosophical tensions or colluding
passages in Frankenstein. Examining the similarities of these ideas gives the clearest
sense of how Hobbes’ philosophy was developed by Wollstonecraft and Godwin and
whether Shelley accepted their interpretations.
The fifth and final chapter, “Monster/Monarch: Man/Commonwealth” begins with an
exploration of the similarities between Hobbes’ metaphor of the political body of the
commonwealth and Shelley’s monster. This chapter explores at length what making
Frankenstein’s creature a symbol of the embodied social contract (Leviathan) means to
the political interpretation of the novel. The creature’s personality, strength, intelligence,
and political maneuvering are read in light of the rights and powers of the monarch
outlined in Leviathan, as well as the role that Victor plays in opposition. I review Victor’s
project from its inception to determine whether Victor is justified in trying to destroy his
creature; alternatively, I interrogate the creature’s behaviour and motivations to determine
if his rebellion is unjustifiable or vindicated in a Hobbesian reading.
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Chapter Two
The Labours of Men of Genius
Burke’s arguments in Reflections on the Revolution in France (1790) affirm many of
the views expressed by Hobbes, particularly his arguments for an inherited monarchy.
The reason for this is that Reflections is a response to radical thinkers who argue the
French revolutionaries should have the support of the English people because they
followed the example of the Glorious Revolution of 1688 (Aldridge 136). Burke firmly
denies any similarity between the events of 1688 and 1789 because he sees the Glorious
Revolution as constitutionally justifiable; he notes that “the two critical periods of the
Restoration and Revolution, when England found itself without a king” were both
instances when the British people chose to preserve “the shape of their old organization”
rather than reduce it to “the organic moleculae of a disbanded people” (Burke Ref 22).
These events are the basis of his legalistic faith in the “practical, tested methods” of
aristocratic rule and inherited powers (Aldridge 136). In Burke’s eyes, the French had
still had recourse to “regenerate the deficient part of the old constitution” (Burke Ref 22)
with the parts that remained like the “foundations of a noble and venerable castle” (35),
but they had squandered the opportunity by starting over “as if [they] had never been
moulded into civil society” (36). Burke stresses this difference between the British and
French revolutions in Reflections, as the implication that the French Revolution was like
the English Revolution would suggest that the English laws and government could be
thrown off as quickly and bloodily as the French.
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Burke does not believe in this possibility, saying that “The body of the people of
England [will]… utterly disclaim it [and]… resist the practical assertion of it with their
lives and fortunes” rather than plunge themselves into the chaos of another revolution or
civil war (16). He saw the Glorious Revolution as an instance where the “antient
indisputable laws and liberties” had been preserved (31) to keep the principle of the
hereditary descent of the monarchy sacred (22). His disbelief in the possible recurrence of
revolution is partly because his views are largely in keeping with those of Hobbes; while
he viewed the Glorious Revolution to be a “just war” he feared that if the arguments of
the Revolutionary Society gained popularity there would be no end of unjust wars (30) as
“no government could stand a moment” if it could be so easily “cashiered” on the
grounds of a sway in public opinion (27). His fear of ongoing civil war is the same theme
that Hobbes’ Leviathan addresses as he makes a case for an undisputed monarchy and
outlines the reasons why revolt is unjustifiable. Hobbes advocates a fearsome and
absolute authority which could reliably keep the nation from “[degenerating] into, a civil
war” (Hobbes 1.13.11). Hobbes further explains that this absolute authority is
immortalized through “the right of succession” as a hereditary monarchy, to prevent men
from re-entering to the “condition of war in every age” (2.19.14). Hobbes’ vision was that
of a brutal peacemaker, to whom succession meant that there was neither another contest
among men for rule of the country, or opportunity for foreign powers to assert their right
to contest rule when a country is without a king.
Aside from the security provided by an established crown, Burke also appreciates the
doctrine of the hereditary right of kings, which he sees as integral to the natural rights of
all English men. He notes that “We have an inheritable crown; an inheritable peerage;
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and an house of commons and a people inheriting privileges, franchises, and liberties,
from a long line of ancestors” and that this is “the happy effect of following nature”
(Burke Ref 33). Rebelling against the succession of monarchy therefore seems as
unnatural to Burke as arguing against any form of inheritance, or arguing that a child
should overthrow his father and lead his family. More importantly, Burke saw in the
conclusion of the Glorious Revolution that the “rights and liberties of the subject” were
“indissolubly” enmeshed in the Declaration of Right, which serves the central purpose of
“settling the succession of the crown” (17). Deposing a monarch and denying hereditary
rule, therefore, does not merely excise a tyrant; it also sets a precedent for all inheritance,
including the rights that are the foundation of peace and security. For example, Burke
posits that if this principle is violated any unpopular king past or present who inherited
the throne could be considered illegitimate (in terms of the Revolution Society’s
rhetoric), and the statute laws that they authorized would also be illegitimated; among
these are documents that guarantee security for common citizens (23). Just as the king
inherits his rights, the same principle (and key documents) protects the rights of all
British men; putting the king’s hereditary powers in jeopardy would result in England
being subjected to the same situation that the French found themselves in after their
revolution.
Burke perceives that the men who have the most influence reorganizing the state after
such a revolution are not members of the aristocracy who have been bred and educated to
wield power; rather, they are the sort of men who have never had power and are
unequipped with the education to make decisions for their fellow men (Burke Ref 41-42).
This practice is against what he understands as the ‘natural’ order of things, as
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generations of breeding produces men naturally fit to take charge of state (49). Burke
emphasizes the respect owed to men of great authority and talent, and expresses dismay
at seeing so few men of reputation or “practical experience” among the National
Assembly after the French Revolution (41-42). Burke fears that even the few men he sees
with potential will be either rendered voiceless in a body that will not follow, or wasted
on the “absurd projects” of the majority (41).
Worse, the majority of potential leaders are the “meddling, daring, subtle, active
[sort], of litigious dispositions and unquiet minds” who do not understand statecraft and
are immediately corrupted by sudden opportunities to pursue their own interests in the
short-term, particularly by seizing upon positions and property that had been left open or
in question during the revolution (42-43). Burke states that putting men like these in
charge is worse than merely subjecting them to “oppression from the state,” because “the
state [itself] suffers oppression” (49) as they throw trade (36), credit (44), and property
into disarray (43). While Reflections is at odds with some of Burke’s other work, his view
of the revolutionaries rebuilding the state is reminiscent of his views expressed in his
satirical work A Vindication of Natural Society (1756), in which he states:
This very monster of mankind appeared in the beginning of his reign to be a
person of virtue. Many of the great tyrants on the records of history have begun
their reigns in the fairest manner. But the truth is, this unnatural power corrupts
both the heart and the understanding. (Burke VNS 19)
This demonstrates his belief that given enough power men inevitably become despotic,
much like Hobbes’ Leviathan is fierce because it is by nature unchallengeable, and just as
both Victor Frankenstein and his creature are initially positive, sympathetic figures who
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are slowly corrupted: Victor by his obsession, and the creature by exposure to the cruelty
of men and the revelation that he can despotically use his strength to control others.
Like Hobbes’ absolute ruler, Burke believed that the representative of a nation “must
be left free to exercise uncontrolled his own discretion” and that until he was replaced (by
an election in Burke’s case, by hereditary succession in Hobbes’) he was the embodiment
of “the majesty of the people” (Elton 44), just like Hobbes described the sovereign power
as the “right to present the person of them all” who have contractually “authorize[d] all
the actions and judgments, of that man” (Hobbes 2.18.1). This representative further
enjoyed the benefit of being unimpeachable as long as he was ruler (Elton 44; Hobbes
2.18.3). Even if the king were to become despotic, Burke observes that the English crown
is not, based on anything he can find in the British ‘constitution,’ a public servant in the
sense that the Revolution Society asserts he was manufactured by the will of the people to
be responsible to them. Rather, Burke states that the king has no responsibility to the
people, except as the embodiment of the power and authority of the state. All men are
responsible “to obey the law in him” as his subordinates (Burke Ref 29). Burke’s opinion
of the unimpeachable sovereign corresponds to Hobbes’ view of the Leviathan, in whom
the authority and strength of every member of the commonwealth is invested, making
him pre-eminent among men as they cannot question their own authority (Hobbes
2.17.13), or disobey it, or harm it, without having harmed themselves (2.18.6-7).
Furthermore, according to Hobbes’ philosophy, men are responsible to the Leviathan
because the law is indistinguishable from the will of the sovereign authority, and his
power to enforce it makes it just (2.21.7).
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Burke’s argument in Reflections on the Revolution in France is, according to Baldick,
“tied to a powerful emotional investment in a ‘natural policy’ which antedates Hobbes’s
artificial man” (Baldick 17) –which is to say, the rights of inheritance and the means by
which the aristocracy naturally breeds men who are fit to lead (Fruchtman 68). Paine
argues against Burke’s belief that fit leaders are bred in Rights of Man, as he believes that
“human beings universally [share the] same nature” and questions how one man might be
more fit to lead than another (23). Where Burke describes the revolutionaries as
“parricidal” and sees the emerging power structure of France as “the great political
‘monster’ of the modern age,” Paine retaliates by re-framing the monarchic system as a
“monstrous” or abusive father, and says that “by distortedly exalting some men… others
are distortedly debased” (Baldick 20-21). According to Paine, the aristocracy is not only
the manufacturer of its own destruction, but has always been “a monstrous regime” and
the “artificial exaggerations of wealth, rank, and privilege” have to be abolished to return
mankind to a more natural state (20). Wollstonecraft’s own responses to Burke,
Vindication of the Rights of Men (1790), and Historical and Moral View of the Origin
and Progress of the French Revolution (1794), support Paine’s thesis, and show her
belief that the French Revolution originated in “the negligence of the decadent and overrefined French court” (Baldick 21). She agrees with Paine that the Revolution was an
inevitable and justifiable response to the inherited regime, and dismisses the horrors that
Burke and Godwin attributed to the revolutionaries as acts perpetrated by “‘a set of
monsters, distinct from the people’,” excusing the majority for the actions of a few (22).
Burke’s argument that “liberties can be regularly perpetuated and preserved sacred”
by “[no] other course or method than that of an hereditary crown” (Burke Ref 25) traces
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the origin of rights to “some time or another… [when] all beginners of dynasties were
chosen by those who called them to govern” [my emphasis] and that the law of hereditary
rule was thus enshrined forever (15). In his mythic social compact, which was very
similar in its composition to Hobbes’, Paine implies that Burke validates his beliefs by
the authority of tradition, but does not trace the precedent to its origin (Fruchtman 68).
Paine argues that because Burke starts his political analysis with an imagined political
compact he not only ignores the original social compact that men came to on equal terms
through mutual affection (24), but has also ignored biblical teachings that described “the
divine origin of these rights…that God had given them from the beginning” with Adam
in Eden (68). Burke has begun his history of the state with a description of circumstances
similar to 1 Samuel 8, when Israel first asked for a king (when Burke’s satirical pamphlet
A Vindication of Natural Society was reprinted in 1858, 1 Samuel 8:19 graced the
preface). Burke has ignored the message of the scripture however, which Paine had
already taken into account in his own work Common Sense (1776) when he argues
against installing monarchies on the grounds of biblical doctrine (Paine CS 13); God
clearly warns the Israelites –already formed in a society– against appointing a king over
themselves, including a description of the things a king would subject them to which God
considered reprehensible (1 Sam. 8: 9-18). Paine points to this passage to make an
argument that rights preceded political organization, instilled in all men by God along
with common sense and “‘unextinguishable feelings to do good’” which “were the
guardians of God’s image in the human heart” (Fruchtman 24). Not only were these
feelings and natural freedoms deadened when placed under the rule of a monarch (22),
but that kings and the aristocracy were less than human, ruled by “their basest instincts…
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to seek power over others” and “unable to use their natural powers of common sense as
[G]od had meant people to use them” (23).
Clearly Paine and Burke hold opposite opinions of the aristocracy. Where Burke states
that “permanent property…education, and… such habits as enlarge and liberalize the
understanding” (qualities he recognizes in the aristocracy, “permanent property” being a
qualification of such) are necessary in a governing body (Burke Ref 41), Paine objects
that men who come into their positions by birth, have the same odds against them as a
peasant in winning the ‘intellectual lottery’ (Paine RM 225) and that hereditary
succession is “as ridiculous as an hereditary poet-laureate” (134). Furthermore, he
perceives that the “aristocracy has a tendency to degenerate the human species” through
its practices of “intermarriage” and isolating itself from the “general stock of society” so
that the “artificial NOBLE shrinks into a dwarf before the NOBLE of Nature” (Paine RM
135). He thus uses the image of physical deformity as a metaphor to underscore moral
degradation, again borrowing from the tradition of describing a political body as
deformed that can be traced back at least to Sir Thomas Browne’s Religio Medici (1643),
albeit employed for his own purposes against the aristocracy (Baldick 14). These
deformities could either refer to the genetic maladies of inbreeding, or, could be a
figurative reference to the way that the nobility is cut off from society which makes them
un-relatable and distant (Paine CS 9). The aristocracy’s seclusion makes them unfamiliar
with the hardships of the world, yet they “act in cases where the highest judgment is
required” and their decisions sometimes reflect their ignorance (9). The aristocracy’s
inability to relate to the sufferings of others also makes it appear inhumanly cruel, as their
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isolation renders them callous to the sufferings of the poor. Without any personal contact
with the poor the rich obviously feel no personal responsibility towards them.
Shelley’s monster illustrates the damning effects of being excluded from society,
particularly as he calls his “vices… the children of a forced solitude” and argues that with
“no ties and no affections, hatred and vice must be [his] portion” (Shelley 121). The
monster’s proposed solution, to write himself into the social contract by establishing
himself as a new patriarch, is figuratively the same solution as the revolutionaries’ (118119). The monster’s intent to travel to the new world and establish a society where he can
grant himself the same rights as man, requires that he supplant Victor’s position as
patriarch. Taking Victor’s place either by reason or force is a revolution on the monster’s
part (119). However, the creature does not propose a radically new form of government
or even the abolition of the social contract to which Victor belongs; rather, he explains
that in his condition he is like that of the Devil, and “everywhere [he sees] bliss” in the
form of society from which “[he] alone is irrevocably excluded” (77-78). His proposal to
remedy this is secession from the society of men to reenact the Genesis story “in the vast
wilds of South America,” where he can live as Adam with another inhuman being (120).
The creature claims that he will “again be virtuous” if Victor allows him this indulgence
(78), but stumbles into the same logical quagmire that Hobbes acknowledged in
Leviathan, namely that “Virtue… in all sorts of subjects, is somewhat that is valued for
eminence; and consisteth in comparison. For if all things were equal in all men, nothing
would be prized” (Hobbes 1.8.1). If relationships between people are the major way
Hobbes says we distinguish virtue, then the creature’s voluntary exile cannot make him
virtuous. Even in the company of his mate, the creature’s claim of virtue is really
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preeminence, because his mate would have no other frame of reference and therefore
virtue is whatever he explains it to be. Hobbes further divides virtue into “two sorts;
natural, and acquired” (1.8.2). Hobbes describes “NATURAL WIT,” which he says is
“gotten by use only, and experience; without method, culture, or instruction,” as part of
virtue; he says such wit proceeds from “celerity of imagining” and “steady direction to
some approved end” (1.8.2). While he could develop his natural wit in isolation, it has to
be assumed that his curiosity and problem-solving skills would have to be engaged to do
so, which would require a mental life beyond the simple act of foraging the creature
implies will be his chief occupation. The creature would not –by Hobbes’ reckoning– be
made more virtuous by this course of action then, because this occupation is little more
than what animals do, and only requires instinct and the use of his basic senses (1.8.2).
The other part of virtue, acquired wit, is dependent on “method and instruction” and “the
right use of speech”; therefore, the creature’s advancement is also limited (1.8.13).
Employing the Edenic image of the creature’s secession might be part of Shelley’s
conservative critique of the revolution; following the pattern authorized in the Bible for
small family units, she justifies a preference for reinstating the system that preceded
kingdoms, but she also rejects violent means to do so. In these ways, Shelley supports
Paine and her parents’ desire for a radical reorganization of society where human rights
are roughly equal, while still founding her opinion in conservative traditions and
scriptural authority.
From Burke and Paine the path to Mary Shelley is a very short and direct one, as both
Mary Wollstonecraft and William Godwin responded independently to Burke’s
Reflections and received only a little less notoriety for their radical opinions than did
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Paine (Baldick 16). William Godwin’s response, Enquiry Concerning Political Justice,
was “the most intellectually prestigious… measured… critique of Government from the
standpoint of rationalist anarchism” and contested that the government, which is “a
Hobbesian ‘artificial man’ with too many heads,” is the true monster in society (24).
Godwin argues that any undertaking by this political body, rather than being the effort of
a unified whole is “distorted in every joint” by the opinions, private interests, and vices of
every person who has a hand in it, so that even well-meant projects become “abortive and
monstrous” (24-25). In this way, Godwin recasts the “Hydra” that had come to stand for
the “popular rabble” since 1643 (14-15) in the role of ‘organized’ government, with its
many competing interests and intentions (25). While his argument does generally
coincide with Paine’s that “it is the institutions of the monarchy and aristocracy that are
monstrous” (24), he does not go so far as to justify the actions of the revolutionaries, who
revolted –in Paine’s words– “[against] the established despotism of the [Monarchy], and
not against the person or principles of [Louis the XVIth]” (Paine RM 97). Godwin’s own
appraisal of the situation was that, while “the ancient tradition of Burkean thought” did
not aid “‘the great cause of humanity’,” Burke was correct in observing that “‘to dragoon
men into the adoption of what we think right is an intolerable tyranny’” and that, in their
quest to “overthrow tyranny,” the French had “become greater tyrants themselves”
(Paulson 538).
I revisit Godwin’s condemnation of political cooperation in chapter four, as it
extended in his eyes from such rigid hierarchical structures as an absolutist monarchy, to
the sudden and irrational collective decisions of a mob (Weston 7). While Godwin agrees
with Hobbes and Burke that “[s]ociety was originally organized to provide security to the
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individual,” and “admits that we still need some kind of social organization to defend our
security,” he resents the tendency of these systems to influence other aspects of daily life
and evolve into self-serving artificial organisms (Carter xxix). Still, Godwin concedes
that, without organization men will “degenerate into chaotic anarchy” (xxix) and hopes
for a “form of social organization that [would] stimulate men to be rational, independent,
and intelligent” (xxvii) by “provid[ing] men with the proper desires” (xx) that they lack
in normal society. Yet, while he cannot hope to see such a system installed without first
removing the one in place, Godwin believes “that revolution and physical punishments
invariably produce more evil than good” (xxxi). He therefore fundamentally disagrees
with Paine about the methods of the French Revolutionaries.
Although Godwin disagreed with Paine on this point, he held great respect for him and
was pleased when “he succeeded in being invited to a dinner where Paine was one of the
guests [November 13, 1791]” (McColley 3) at the home of the radical printer Joseph
Johnson (Aldridge 134). The meeting occurred as Godwin worked on Political Justice
(McColley 3). While this difference of opinion would cast doubt on Conway’s assertion
that Paine had left “the supervisory details [of the second publication of Rights of Man] to
William Godwin” and a small cadre of like-minded individuals, there is evidence in the
form of a note between Thomas Holcroft and Godwin, that they had a copy of the original
unedited manuscript and preface before they were published (Aldridge 134-135). This
note, a number of editorial corrections between editions, and several short notes in
Godwin’s record of “literary activities” imply that he had not only followed the details of
the publication, but that he had “‘Call[ed] on Paine’,” dined with him once on the fourth
of November “at a famous meeting of the Revolution Society”, and received responses

28

from Paine via post all before his dinner on the thirteenth (136). Aldridge himself is
skeptical that Godwin “was ever involved with The Rights of Man” even if he was
involved with Common Sense (136), but concedes that it is possible “that the ‘ears and
eyes’ of government agents had caused them to exercise extreme caution in its
distribution” (135), leaving it ambiguous whether Godwin helped contribute to Paine’s
success. The fear of persecution might explain the redaction of “belonging to a committee
to oversee The Rights of Man” from Godwin’s notes (134), which might also be true if
Paine had also had a hand in helping Godwin with his own book, Political Justice.
The opposing presentations of the monarchy supported by Paine, Wollstonecraft, and
Godwin as a cannibalistic parent (Baldick 21), and Burke’s portrayal of it as a wounded
parent under attack by his own children (17) both originate in the image of the “‘body
politic’,” in which the state is personified as a being wherein the monarch stands as the
symbol for the “integral and sacred whole” and everyone under his rule is understood to
be a part of him (14). This concept draws inspiration from 1 Corinthians 12, in which the
body is described as “not one member, but many” that are mutually dependent on each
other with God and the Holy Spirit uniting men in “the Body of Christ” or the church (1
Cor. 12: 14, 27). In the introduction to Leviathan, Hobbes draws from this imagery to
elaborate on the political organization of the “STATE… which is but an artificial man…
in which, the sovereignty is an artificial soul… the magistrates, and other officers of
judicature and execution, artificial joints” etc. which must function as though they were
one body for the greater health of the whole (Hobbes 7). Within this body, all members of
the political machinery (including those that only benefit from the general security of the
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state) submit their will to the “artificial soul” (7) in the same way that the body follows
the directions of the brain.
Hobbes believed that the competing interests of men would naturally tear the fabric of
society apart in a perpetual war (1.13.3-4), so the viability of this organizational system
depended on the strength of a key figure to bend all other parts to his will, as the
“political discord… of dismembered and contending organs” (Baldick 14) or the death of
this “artificial man” would mean “civil war,” riots, and the suffering of all men in the
commonwealth (Hobbes 7). To prevent this suffering, “the multitude so united in [the
sovereign]… hath the use of so much power and strength conferred on him, that by terror
thereof, he is enabled to conform the wills of them all” to direct them to act against their
private interests for the good of the whole (2.18.13). Hobbes called the agreement or
acquiescence to this arrangement the social contract.
This image of an “automaton” given an “artificial life” and soul, framed like “the
body natural” but “of greater stature and strength” (7) closely resembles the description
Victor gives of his own resolution “to make the being of a gigantic stature… about eight
feet in height, and proportionably large” (Shelley 35-36). Victor’s construction of the
creature, gathering its parts from a variety of places (Shelley 36), also resembles the
embodiment of the masses into one body. Just like the body politic is made up of many
people united under a single sovereign, the pieces of many individuals are formed into the
creature, yet it has one identity. The creature, in this light, is the physical embodiment of
the social contract, and the will of the monarch being exercised over a nation. Hobbes’
belief that the social contract was forged to escape a condition of “war of every one
against every one,” where every man had a right to anything he could forcibly keep, also
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fits nicely into the Frankenstein storyline (Hobbes 1.14.4). As the creature admits, when
he was first created he did not think twice about commandeering the “shepherd’s
breakfast” or hut while he wandered, but naturally assumed he had a right to it (Shelley
83). This action could be interpreted as a confirmation of Hobbes’ view of mankind’s
natural self. The creature has essentially been born into this natural state, with the right
“to use his own power, as he will himself, for the preservation of his own nature;” unable
to trust anyone around him, yet strong enough to take anything he needs by force
(Hobbes 1.14.1) unless he is confronted by a coalition of villagers (Shelley 83). His
ability to overpower and take command of Victor (77) is also in keeping with a
Hobbesian outlook on life and politics whereby one must have a “visible power to keep
them in awe, and tie them by fear of punishment to the performance of their covenants”
(Hobbes 2.17.1). The monster convinces him first to consent to making a mate (Shelley
122) and then follows, confronts, and threatens Victor when he breaks his oath (139-140).
From this perspective, the creature obviously typifies the monarch of Hobbes’ vision,
but the monster’s more obvious acts of rebellion are more frequently interpreted as a
depiction of the French or English revolutionaries, whether examined from the viewpoint
of Burke or Paine; this outlook results in an alternative reading that is either less or more
sympathetic to the creature. For example, if the creature is read as acting like the English
revolutionaries, then Hobbes’ interpretation of his actions would be that they are
unjustifiable. The monster’s murder of William and framing of Justine for the crime are
clearly vindictive acts (117-118); they serve no constructive purpose except to upset
Victor and derail the justice system of Geneva (64-65). If Victor can be rightly said to be
the head of the creature, as he “[attains the] sovereign power…as when a man maketh his
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children” (Hobbes 2.17.15) and “could claim the gratitude of his child [more]
completely” than a normal father (Shelley 36), then this rebellion would be to the
creature’s own detriment, just as any man who rebelled against the commonwealth could
be seen to rebel against his own security (Hobbes 2.18.1). Furthermore, the creature
might have appealed to Victor’s hubris, or his rationality to get what he hopes for, if the
monster had not already “kindled anew in [Victor] the anger that had died away while he
narrated his peaceful life” (Shelley 119). Had the monster subjected himself to Victor in
the proper spirit of a subject to a king or feudal lord, and shown Victor thankfulness and
“gratitude towards [him] for one benefit” (120) then Victor might have felt obligated to
provide for the creature. The social contract provides peace because all of the subjects
defer to their king, who has the power to enforce retribution if they harm each other
(Hobbes 2.17.13). If the creature had not harmed anyone, he might have expected Victor
to protect him from other men and give him a mate, but all he can expect afterwards is
retribution. The monster’s revenge here is more like the uncontrolled and undirected rage
of the mob than the punishment of a king, and thus takes on the monstrous characteristics
that Burke saw in the “chaotic and confused nature of revolutionary events” (Baldick 18).
Burke’s opinion of the revolutionary attacks on the aristocracy are similarly borne-out
here, as Victor and his younger brother are part of the ruling class of Geneva by virtue of
their father’s position (Shelley 117). On the other hand, the strength and cleverness that
Victor endows his creature with parody the natural talents of leadership that Burke
imagines in the aristocracy; portrayed as such, the creature is only stepping into his
rightful place of command.
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Paine’s vision of the aristocracy could also be seen embodied in the nature of the
monster. Paine’s opinion of human beings, as outlined in Common Sense, is that all
human beings have “innate moral sensibilities” (Fruchtman 20-21) “rooted in a person’s
affective nature [that are] the guardians of God’s image in the human heart” (24). These
feelings of conscience and the love for fellow man were, according to Paine, the very
reason that man sought out social interaction. These feelings are a gift from God, without
which, “the social compact would dissolve, and justice be extirpated from the earth, or
have only a casual existence” (24). Although the creature has innate reasoning and a
desire for human sympathy (Shelley 107), he comes to recognize that “the human senses
are insurmountable barriers” to establishing himself in human society (119). Instead, he
feels compelled to remove himself to the farthest reaches of the world with a being of like
composition (120). The creature’s reasoning (which approaches God-given feelings) and
his inhumanity can be reconciled if his first attempts to embody these “innate moral
sensibilities” (Fruchtman 20-21) are acts of imitation based on what he sees of the De
Laceys (Shelley 88-89) and he never truly possesses them. From Paine’s perspective this
impersonation would be a mere shadow of real conscience because Victor, not God,
created the creature and could not grant him a gift that only God can bestow. A faltering
imitation explains the monster’s rapidly degenerating capacity to display moral traits –if
the creature ever really had a conscience and his tale is not a complete fabrication to
manipulate Victor; this would make the creature resemble the aristocracy even more.
Paine argues that “kings and nobles…had denied the people’s natural equality… [which
was] God’s original creation” and “had seized power, stolen it, to enforce their
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sovereignty” (Fruchtman 71) so that they “lived cooperatively with no one” (25). In fact,
Paine wrote in Rights of Man that he considered the monarchy so “inhuman” that
If man dared to describe human nature on the basis of “Kings, courts, and
cabinets,” he would never have a portrait of genuine humanity […] only a portrait
of a creature “that reflection would shudder at and humanity disown. . . . Man,
naturally as he is, with all his faults, is not up to the character… [”] (36)
The monster embodies the inhuman character of the monarchy that Paine envisioned as
he learns not just to perpetrate, but enjoy violent acts that torment Victor, but that these
statements can only be true of the creature. Paine states that, “Every child born into the
world must be considered as deriving its existence from God. The world is as new to him
as it was to the first man that existed, and his natural right in it is of the same kind” (Paine
RM 66). The creature’s unnatural creation is the only way that his God-given conscience
could literally be explained out of existence. Furthermore, this creature knows from
experience that it is not equal to human beings, that it is not part of “God’s original
creation,” and that it is very capable of forcing others to do its will by intimidation,
violence, or plotting (Fruchtman 71). In this way, the monster again stands for the
politically elite and corrupt.
Finally, the alternative ‘sympathetic’ reading of the creature (where he stands for the
French revolutionaries again) is based on the thinking of Wollstonecraft and Paine. In this
interpretation, the creature’s actions have to be viewed specifically through the lens of the
creature’s abandonment by Victor (Shelley 40). When Victor flees the sight of his
creation, he is left to be self-sufficient, and immediately fends for himself, although he is
in effect a newborn (80); were it not for his superior constitution (96), he would probably
have frozen or starved to death immediately. This abandonment and impoverishment
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allies the creature closely to the French Revolutionaries, as the “widening gulf between
court luxury and popular starvation [had] made French life inhospitable” for the poor who
would eventually rebel (Baldick 21). In this context Victor, the literal aristocrat and
figurative monarch for reasons shown above, who should hold himself responsible for his
creature, displays a negligence and callousness to his creature that evokes the
aristocracy’s treatment of the poor in France at the time of the Revolution. Thus, the
creature is as justified in rebellion as the French people were (in Wollstonecraft and
Paine’s eyes), and is not naturally evil, but can be considered “rendered ferocious by
misery” (Baldick 22).
Even according to the reading where Victor constitutes an abusive ruling class,
Wollstonecraft would not excuse the creature completely, as he clearly stands for “one of
the elements of the Parisian crowd [that] deserve[s] to be regarded as monstrous” because
of the atrocities it commits (Baldick 22). Paine’s justification salvages the creature’s
motivations somewhat, as he argues that, just as generations of monarchs had “lulled
[everyone else] into the unwitting slumber of slavery… [and] deadened their natural
abilities to think and feel” (Fruchtman 19), they unnaturally “deprived their victims of the
freedom to choose and destroyed or badly compromised their sense of self,” leaving them
with “a numbing effect on their minds and hearts” (22). As a result, the monarchy’s
victimized subjects become incapable of using their innate goodness and compassion;
rather than being driven by a healthy yearning for freedom, they suffer abuse until they
are forced to respond out of desperation. When they finally reach this point, they cannot
be expected to act with self-restraint or good judgment; the warped, unreasoning beings
they become must necessarily respond in a manner that is inhuman. A parallel exists in
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the events that shape the creature’s view of humanity: he is attacked without
understanding why (Shelley 83), rejected by the family he admires and looks after (110),
shot for having saved a young woman from drowning (115), and threatened by his last
hope –an “unprejudiced” child (116). Thus abandoned by his creator and categorically
denied by humanity, all of whom constitute a ‘ruling class’ of those better off than
himself, the creature is slowly stripped of what humanity he had attempted to imitate and
is reduced to moral depravity, and the abuse of his strength, as he “like the arch fiend…
finding [himself] unsympathized with, [wishes] to tear up the trees, spread havoc and
destruction, and then… to [enjoy] the ruin” (111).
The creature’s self-identification is the deciding factor for giving favour to the
Hobbesian reading. The creature’s story as he reveals it to Victor is untrustworthy, with
the exception of the death of William and the trial of Justine, which can only be taken as
proof of his ferocity, and cast doubt on the rest of his tale. That being said, there is no
other way the monster could have learned the Miltonic account of Satan and, taking
Victor at his word, this literary work is central to the creature’s struggle to come to terms
with his own identity (96). The creature identifies with two characters from this story,
observing that “like Adam, [he] was… united by no link to any other being in existence;”
and like Lucifer, the first among the fallen angels whose “bitter gall of envy” the creature
relates to (105). Both of these figures sin against their creator and are punished, cut off
from God and cast out of Eden or into Hell. Reducing the choice that the creature makes
to a moral binary is therefore reductionist. Although the creature compares his ugliness to
the form God gave man, limiting the difference between Adam and Lucifer to an
aesthetic one is also over-simplified (105). Satan is described in Paradise Lost as
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“Clothed with transcendent brightness” and, although he is changed, he is not described
as hideous or even less than Adam; moreover, he was more beautiful than Adam until he
disobeyed (Milton 17). The creature further envies Satan’s position as much as Adam’s
because Satan has “fellow Devils” (Shelley 105). These complicate the creature’s choice
between role-models, but he most clearly relates to Satan’s feelings of ill-will (105).
Given the political overtones of the novel, the most appropriate distinction between
the two figures is their significance as political archetypes. The creature is undeniably the
Adam of his race, and he even seeks to have his own Eve made to live in the gardens of
the new world (120). This choice would cement his alliance with the Adam archetype,
which represents the origin story of human rights described by Paine. Adam, the creation
which God made in his own image and impressed with “‘unextinguishable feelings’ to do
good… [to preserve His] image” (Fruchtman 24), is the progenitor, the basis, and
fundamental precedent for all rights. He symbolizes the personal authority of the
individual to use reason to live amicably under his own governorship. This sounds like
what the creature claims to be his sole desire, to form sympathetic bonds with other
creatures so that he can live without fearing “the barbarity of man” (Shelley 84). It might
have been possible for the creature to make a case for these rights if he had approached
Victor in the spirit, or even guise of Adam. However, Victor did not share God’s wisdom
in imparting his creature with a moral code, and in his ambition to create “A new species
[that] would bless [him] as its creator and source” had the hubris to create something
greater than himself (36). The creature is therefore incapable of modelling himself after
Adam’s behaviour and becomes monstrous, echoing Paine’s view that creating
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government was an error because the type of men willing to seize power were naturally
the ones who would become tyrannical rulers (Fruchtman 23).
Ultimately, the creature’s self-identification with Lucifer validates a Hobbesian
reading of the novel. Not to say that a Hobbesian political paradigm is in itself immoral,
but that Lucifer’s ambition makes him the preferable archetype (as the monster’s creator,
Victor correspondingly comes close to a god-figure). There are several similarities that
predetermine the creature’s position in the Hobbesian and Miltonic paradigms. First, the
creature, like the monarch in the commonwealth, is denied the ability to forfeit his power
because he is the only person who is not “party to the covenant” (Hobbes 2.18.4). He
alone remains in the “condition of war of every one against every one” (1.14.4). The
creature, forced by his unnatural creation to live on the outskirts of a society which is
already engaged in a political covenant, exists in the same state as a monarchic figure in
Hobbesian political philosophy, particularly as his behaviour grows more authoritative
over Victor. In this state he is for all intents and purposes in a war against all of mankind,
not by choice, but by the act of Victor joining his parts together. This is also similar to
Satan’s expulsion from Heaven.
Second, his identification with Satan finally clarifies the position he takes against
Frankenstein (Shelley 119). Hobbes’ belief that all men are entitled (in the pre-social
contract state) to whatever they can take and hold by force (Hobbes 1.13.3) is best
represented by Satan, who felt entitled to God’s place and tried to take it forcefully by
waging “impious war in Heav’n” (Milton 14). The relationship to the Miltonic paradigm
clarifies the monster’s chosen course in the novel, as he uses murder (Shelley 117) and
shows of force (77) to appropriate the things he desires, or to intimidate his creator. His
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inclination to take and hold what he wants by force, while recognizing that he is in
opposition to a pre-existing social contract places him in the same politicized role as
Lucifer in Paradise Lost. The creature claims that Victor owes him a duty because Victor
created him (77) similar to the way that Lucifer claims he and the other angels “held their
places by right eternal,” and that God’s appointment of Christ over Satan was “an act of
effrontery” (Rebhorn 83). Both of these arguments presume that the subject has inherent
rights in a monarchic system that are not merely permitted by the ruler. This is part of
Satan’s deception which he uses to seduce other angels; he deliberately perverts the truth
“of God’s goodness and justice” (81) by depicting “Him [as] a tyrant who has usurped
unwarranted authority” (83). In Paradise Lost Lucifer is portrayed “play[ing] the very
role of servile flatterer he detests in order to advance himself at the divine court” and he
continues to garner support among his supporters by flattering them with “titles of
nobility” after they are ejected from Heaven (83), the creature imitates this behaviour
when he addresses Victor at their first meeting, calling him “my creator… my natural
lord and king” –while at the same time calling himself “the fallen angel” (Shelley 77).
Like Satan in Paradise Lost, the creature uses flattery and deception wherever possible,
and whenever that wavers or fails to persuade he immediately resorts to threats or acts of
violence (119). In this way the creature models himself directly after Lucifer, adopting
the conspicuous abuse of political terms, as Satan uses “metaphors [for political
organization] from our fallen language” to misrepresent the ineffable glory of God and
“perverts the true nature of things on a basic linguistic level” (Rebhorn 92); the creature
falsely plays to Victor’s ego and flatters him with titles (Shelley 77), trying to inspire
Victor to divine benevolence, but also impresses upon Victor that he is not in a position
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of strength –revealing that he either does not understand, or does not respect the titles and
the offices they signify.
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Chapter Three
To Pursue History to Her Hiding Places
Frankenstein is a novel born from a mind particularly indebted to political thought; as
a result, Shelley’s work cannot be completely and thoroughly read unless all aspects of
the story are equally submitted to the scrutiny of a political lens. In the following chapter
imagery, tropes, and phrases related to the most important locations in the novel,
Ingolstadt, Geneva, and Mont Blanc, are investigated to establish the setting’s historical
and political importance to European history. These locations are reviewed to establish
how they relate to Shelley biographically, to revolutionary history, and figure into a
Hobbesian reading. While Randel has examined what these places mean to Shelley as
they relate to revolutionary political thought, this chapter also looks at how their
significance changes between Hobbes and Shelley, and how they stay the same.
Ingolstadt and Geneva have special relevance to the story as the sites of Victor’s
education and his creature’s construction. They also have historical importance politically
as sources of radical and revolutionary thinking, which Shelley’s contemporaries felt as
an anxiety towards subversive thinking from the continent, and Hobbes’ contemporaries
conceived in religious terms as encroachments by the Presbytery and papacy. Mont Blanc
is also important, because although little physical action takes place there it is the seat of
dialogue between Victor and his creation. It is also where the creature’s character
develops the most, and the first place readers hold the differing viewpoints of the creature
and Victor in mind at once while coming to terms with the idea that the creature is the
antithesis of what was expected. Through these locations the following chapter outlines
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some of the items of historical and geopolitical relevance that illuminate the nuances of
this reading.
The first and most politically relevant location from a revolutionary standpoint is
Ingolstadt, the site of Victor’s education and the creature’s construction, but as Fred V.
Randel explains, in Shelley’s time it was better known for being central to a popular
conspiracy theory. Augustin de Barruel’s Memoirs Illustrating the History of Jacobinism
(1799) is one of the undisputed source texts for Frankenstein, which we know both
Shelleys read six months after Mary Shelley conceived Frankenstein (Randel 466)
(Butler lvix). Percy Bysshe Shelley’s interest in this conspiracy is often attributed to
Barruel’s Memoirs, which points to Ingolstadt as a fount of seditious thought, a base of
operations from which secret societies of “Enlightenment intellectuals” were extending
their influence to overthrow traditional governments across Europe (Butler 36, 19). The
creature’s origin in Ingolstadt, followed by the havoc wreaked on its way to Geneva,
mirrors the spread of radical propaganda as it was envisioned in the popular imagination
(19). Randel points out that the plot of Frankenstein while Victor resides at Ingolstadt
borrows from Barruel’s allegations against Adam Weishaupt, the “found[er of] a secret
society called the ‘Illuminees’ at Ingolstadt on 1 May 1776” (466). Here Waushaupt
supposedly “led a double life at the University of Ingolstadt: distinguishing himself in
respectable academic pursuits while [he] secretly, in the privacy of his rooms… recruited
disciples… infiltrated the Freemasons, penetrated France” and set about disseminating
the radical ideas that sustained the Jacobins (467). Barruel’s description of these events as
“‘form[ing] a monstrous digest’… of subversive thinking” is equated to the way Victor
gathers his materials together (466-7).
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Shelley’s account of Victor raiding “the unhallowed damps of the grave… charnel
houses… [the] dissecting room and the slaughter house” (Shelley 36-7) also unites
Victor, in the minds of her readers, to Burke’s description of the philosophes “as
sorcerers, alchemists, and fanatical chemists… [robbing graves] to provide materials for
arms… [and willing to] sacrifice the whole human race to the slightest of their
experiments” (Baldick 18-19). In the same way Victor shows his willingness to “torture
the living animal to animate the lifeless clay” (Shelley 36). While such imagery is
employed by Burke to describe a force bent solely on destruction –grinding the physical
remnants of art and history down to fuel an effort to destroy the remaining vestige of
aristocracy (Baldick 19) –Shelley uses this imagery to her own ends. Victor robs graves,
just as Burke accuses the philosophes –but by providing Victor’s perspective, Shelley
repurposes the imagery to explain that his ends are not destructive. In his opinion,
Victor’s goal is to create new life, “and pour a torrent of light into our dark world”
(Shelley 36). This shift of focus upholds the complexity of the text. Shelley clearly does
not condone Victor’s reckless prying into the secrets of life and death, as she makes clear
through his “moralizing” after the fact (37-38); but she places Burke’s images in a
context that shows that from the opposing perspective of the revolutionaries the
underlying intent is creative in nature, rather than malicious for its own sake.
The trope of scientists being radically subversive does not originate in Burke’s
account of the French; it is part of a tradition of accusatory writing levelled at threats to
the British crown that goes back to the foundation of chemical and alchemical sciences.
Shelley’s description of Victor trying to “animate the lifeless clay” (36), for example, is a
perversion of the Bible’s account of God forming Adam out of clay, but Victor’s
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particular aptitude in the field of chemistry (32) marks him as one of Burke’s “fanatical
chemists” (Baldick 18). This image can be traced at least as far back as 1617, when John
Hales preached against men who would “exerc[ise] their ingenuity on obscurer passages
of the Scriptures” in attempts to confuse or manipulate the faithful for personal gain
(Ross, Schneider and Waldman 107). Hales’ sermon depicted these men, in a phrase
eerily prophetic of Shelley’s, as men that “deal with Scriptures as Chemickes deale with
naturall bodies, torturing them to extract that out of them which God and nature never put
in them” (107). Victor’s attempt to thus gain authority over life and death by “pursu[ing]
nature to her hiding places” is as threatening an act to heavenly authority (trespassing on
God’s dominion), as it is to earthly authority by building an inhuman army (Shelley 36).
Victor’s actions are the physical equivalent of the doctrinal threat Hales addresses,
wherein men might delve into the “impenetrable mysteries” of the Gospel (Ross,
Schneider and Waldman 106) and fabricate explanations, thereby claiming “a distinction
between fundamentals and accessories of faith” as the Presbyterians did, or “the authority
to establish new dogma” like the Papacy (105). Both of these outcomes threaten a
religious community because they spur divisions. When lines are drawn on issues people
believe to be essential to the well-being of their souls, the perceived stakes inspire fervent
reactions. When believers fall on opposite sides of said lines, the clash of opinion has
been tantamount to a civil war in the past, and has often escalated into literal bloodshed.
Hales and Hobbes believed that the church needs unification based solely on the belief
“Jesus Christ is the Son of God,” a ‘civil war’ of this kind was not only unwanted for its
own sake, but a redundancy (112). This was particularly true for Hobbes, who preferred
the organization of the Anglican Church, but “insist[ed] that all churches must more or
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less openly profess their subjectivism” (Martel 110) and that the ruler of the nation
should be “the rightful determinant of liturgy and doctrine” (6).The effect of causing
disunity in a church is to disquiet the minds of the superstitious and easily-led. Once
these church members see their elders and leaders become embittered, their faith is either
polarized, which causes more disharmony in taking sides, or they search for greater
assurances of their spiritual well-being among more organized and self-assured
congregations. From the point of view of an Anglican fearful of Catholic and
Presbyterian influences, such divisions in the state-centric Anglican Church would, in
Hobbes’ or Hales’ reasoning, create an opening for a larger political force to infiltrate
with dogma and superstition for political gain.
Such a suspicion would in part explain why Hobbes’ “scorn for Presbyterian
preachers… was extreme and outspoken” (Ross, Schneider and Waldman 96). They
pretended to the same powers as the Roman Catholic clergy: to excommunicate the
princes of Christian states, and assume political authority over the state by asserting
theocratic authority over its subjects (Hobbes 4.44.17). The Presbytery “in the beginning
of the reign of Queen Elizabeth” had the further potential to rally support from amongst
the working classes (Ross, Schneider and Waldman 92). As Hobbes shows in Behemoth,
these ministers preached a message that humored sinful behaviour and allowed men to
accrue wealth by it, as long as they would duly fill the church’s purse (92). Hobbes
accuses these preachers of misconduct, stating that they “applied themselves wholly to
the winning of the people to a liking of their doctrines and… persons…to the
advancement of the Presbyterian ministers” rather than caring for their parishioners’
spiritual well-being (92).
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Hobbes’ disdain for the Roman Catholic Church is even greater than for the
Presbyterians, as evidenced in Leviathan, where he addresses the ways that the Papacy
exploits the beliefs of Christians to undermine the power of monarchs. Hobbes asks “to
whose benefit it conduceth” that a foreign power can decide whether princes are
legitimate heirs to their thrones, have authority to rule under God, or can tell subjects that
they no longer have to obey their head of state (Hobbes, 1.12.32)? He acknowledges that
these powers over a state make the Pope a dangerous enemy to the monarchic system of
law, but it is the means by which the power is wrested from the hands of sovereigns that
Hobbes takes issue with. When Hobbes pronounces the Roman Catholic Church to be the
“Kingdome of Darknesse” (4.47.21), he does so in the context of a chapter dedicated to
“The confusion [caused by] more or less deliberate polic[ies] by corrupt political and
religious leaders in order to mislead citizens into subservience” (Martel 109). The power
of the “papacy” exists, outside of Rome, only “in the fancies of ignorant people…in the
fear that seduced people stand in, of their excommunication; upon hearing of false
miracles, false traditions, and false interpretations of the Scripture” (Hobbes 4.47.33).
A clear example of this confusion between religious and political authority in
Frankenstein is borne out after the trial scene of Justine Moritz in Geneva, when she
admits “I did confess; but I confessed a lie…that I might obtain absolution” (Shelley 66).
At the commencement of her trial, Justine’s confidence in her own innocence is enough
that she says “if their testimony shall not outweigh my supposed guilt, I must be
condemned, although I would pledge my salvation on my innocence” [emphasis mine]
(63). After her trial this pledge is tested by her confessor, who “threaten[s]
excommunication and hell fire” until she is bullied into confessing to William’s murder
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(66). Excommunication is only one threat, Hobbes identifies, that the Catholic and
Presbyterian (Hobbes 4.47.4) churches use to manipulate the fearful and garner power to
themselves. Hobbes claims that the belief the soul itself will not die with the body is part
of what he called the “Error of Separated Essences” –a metaphysical notion where
“representational forms…take on a[n imaginary] life of their own and supersede what
they purportedly represent” (Martel 121). As Hobbes’ materialism explains, if the soul
will die as Hobbes says, then it cannot be in danger of excommunication, and even less in
danger of perdition’s fire, as he asks “how an incorporeal substance can be capable of
pain, and tormented in… hell or purgatory” (Hobbes 4.46.20). Fear for the well-being of
the soul after death, he argues, is an error that originated with the Pharisees when they
mingled Jewish law with “the vain philosophy and theology of the Grecians” (4.46.12),
and was perpetuated in “Universities, and thence into the Church… from Aristotle”
(4.46.14). This doctrine has been preserved by the Church for the reason that becomes
obvious: by claiming the power to threaten an intangible and immortal soul, the Church
maintains its control over the laity.
Shelley’s example illustrates the Hobbesian problem very clearly: Justine is frightened
enough by the threat of a mere man, that she ignores both the truth of her God-given
senses, and the conscience that God put in her to the point she “[begins] to think that [she
is] the monster that he [says she is]” (Shelley 66). In this way Justine has confused the
signifier (as the confessor is only an earthly representation) with the source of his
authority –omniscient, almighty God –as though He is unaware of her innocence or
powerless to protect her. Justine figuratively bows to a messenger at the expense of
offending the king, when she should “hazard [her] soul upon [her] own judgment, rather
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than that of any other man that is unconcerned in [her] damnation” (Hobbes 4.46.37). The
confusion of authority she feels when threatened with excommunication is only one of
the articles of Catholic faith that Hobbes labels as “superstition” in book four of
Leviathan, “The Kingdom of Darkness.” Just as Shelley’s depiction of Victor as a
chemist and vivisectionist (Shelley 32, 36) bears similarity to Burke’s portrayal of the
French Revolutionaries (Baldick 18) and goes back to Hales (Ross, Schneider and
Waldman 107), similarities between Victor and Hobbes’ depiction of the clergy carry the
weight of anti-Catholic rhetoric that can be traced back hundreds of years.
First among Hobbes’ grievances with Catholic dogma is the perpetuity of pagan
occultism in their teachings. A parallel is found in the description of how taken Victor is
at a young age with the works of “[Cornelius Agrippa], and afterwards of Paracelsus and
Albertus Magnus” claiming to be their “disciple” (Shelley 23). Victor identifies this
pervasive occultism as one of the first influences that sets him on the path to damnation,
and his interests in the “philosopher’s stone and the elixir of life” shape the course of his
studies as an adult (22-23). These fantasies, like the “raising of ghosts or devils” (24),
evoke Hobbes’ estimation of the materials that “ecclesiastics” use to ensnare the minds of
young men, “certain charms compounded of metaphysics, and miracles… and abused
scripture” which the clergy use to make them “natural fools” (Hobbes 4.47.27).
Alchemical subjects distract Victor from the “rational theory of chemistry” (Shelley 23),
and tempt him to abandon “realities of little worth” (30). Shelley’s version of Hobbesian
“metaphysics, and miracles” (Hobbes 4.47.27) stunts the development of Victor’s reason
by encouraging his devotion to the inane. Nothing, in Hobbes’ mind, can come of
believing these superstitions except allowing one’s mind to become pliant and domitable.
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In particular, Shelley’s reference to the “raising of ghosts” (Shelley 24) proceeds from the
Roman Church, which introduced “all the histories of apparitions, and ghosts… to make
good [its] doctrines of hell” (Hobbes 4.46.41). Hobbes claims that the papacy either
invented or entertained these fantasies to give force to their claim of performing
exorcisms so that people will believe the priesthood has supernatural powers (4.47.15).
The second issue is Victor’s study of Latin, the language of priests (Shelley 25). Even
though Victor begins learning Latin in Geneva, this instruction is part of a larger
indictment against universities, which first held up the Catholic Church in opposition to
the sovereigns of nations (Hobbes 2.30.14) and taught Latin because it was the language
of the Roman law and faith (4.46.13), even though it is now only “the ghost of the old
Roman language” (4.47.22). Hobbes calls universities “the operatories of the clergy,”
and likens their work to the “enchantment[s]” of fairies (4.47.27). Hobbes shows obvious
disdain for the teachings of these universities, as he says in Behemoth that “[what the
pupils learn] amounts to no more than an imperfect knowledge of Greek and Latin”
(Ross, Schneider and Waldman 93) and that qualities of the language itself disguise
falsehood, deliver false truths, and obstruct men from finding real truth (Hobbes 4.46.40).
This theme of universities acting as sources of inappropriate or subversive learning (as
shown above in the case of Adam Weishaupt) is made more explicit in the 1831 edition
of Shelley’s novel. Marilyn Butler observes that Victor’s educators are rewritten here as
the “first identifiable villains” and that the reputation of the University of Ingolstadt is
impugned as a “notoriously unorthodox” place where Victor is deliberately taught “bad
knowledge” (Butler 198). Professor Waldman undergoes a notable change between
editions. Where in the 1818 text he credits ancient philosophers and alchemists as having
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done legwork for modern science, the 1831 text shows he was “indeed teaching arcane
magic under the name of natural science” (199). These changes, added to Butler’s
observation that Victor “is given an explicitly religious consciousness,” distance the
novel from the scientific as it takes more cues from the arcane (199). The cumulative
result of these changes is that the recklessness of the pupil carries less of a burden of
guilt, and the monstrous outcome of his experiments is attributed to the malfeasance of a
faculty indulging superstition rather than science. As Martel notes, according to Hobbes
all Western thought founded in Greek philosophy (as taught in universities) is part of the
broad subject he called “demonology,” because the truth cannot be divulged from
erroneous principles based on misconceptions of the natural world (Martel 109). The
similarities between the universities and the clergy reinforce the suspicions of both. Just
as people were suspicious of what was taught in universities, the clergy was suspected of
preaching sedition or rebellion, and the cloistered nature of both institutions, little of
which was publicly understood, made them mysterious (Davison 127).
Third, Victor’s choice to live in monastic study and his status as an unmarried man
likens him to a Catholic priest or monk (Shelley 28).Victor learns secrecy and avoidant
behaviour when his father disapproves of authors that interest him (23), and his small
family circle accustoms him to solitude and leaves him wary of new people (28). He
displays little interest in whether society stands or crumbles, but his infatuation with the
idea of being the progenitor of a new race would suggest a greater interest in the latter
(36). Victor’s lack of investment in society makes his role in it dubious at best and his
ambition (whether he acknowledges it or not) puts him at cross-purpose with the rest of
humankind. The portrayal of figures like monks and priests in the popular gothic
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literature of Shelley’s time as subversive and sexually repressed is exemplified in the
underlying theme of taboo sexuality in the 1818 edition of Frankenstein (Davison 134).
This unconventional sexuality is established in the absence of sexual impetus on Victor’s
part, who allows his mother to arrange his marriage (Shelley 26), remains at Ingolstadt
when his studies are completed instead of returning to marry Elizabeth (33), and whose
father sees nothing unusual in Victor’s choice to delay his marriage for yet another two
years (126). Incest is also implied to have ill-effects on the health of Victor’s family –
evidenced by Victor’s father and brother, and explicit in Victor’s betrothal to a close
blood relation (Butler 200). Butler notes that these incestuous implications are lessened in
the changes made to the 1831 text, as Elizabeth’s blood relationship is removed, and
Victor’s father and brother are markedly healthier (200).
The possibility of perverse sexuality among the priesthood is not a matter of interest to
Hobbes per se; however, in his comparison between the clergy and fairies he notes that
even though fairies –like priests– do not get married, some of them (“incubi”) still engage
in sexual intercourse (Hobbes 4.47.30). The allegation that priests also engage in illicit
sex is only implied by the framework of Hobbes’ analogy, but the intimation that some
are incubi-like colours the entire institution. Conversely, Hobbes’ primary interest is in
the asexuality of the clergy and its justification at an institutional level. Hobbes states in
Leviathan that the sexless nature of priests stems from a demonological reading of the
scriptures by the papacy, who claim the kingdom of God exists in our time, which
Hobbes says has not been possible since Saul, and will not be on Earth again until the
return of Christ (4.44.4). In this reading, the Catholic Church claims to be the present
authority, “that is to say, sole heirs of the kingdom of God in this world” and have to be
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refused the covenant of marriage because Christ said: “at the coming of [His] kingdom
the children of God shall neither marry, nor be given in marriage” (4.46.34). The
clergy’s power hinges on the public accepting their interpretation (or misreading) of
unclear scripture, so wherever it is joined or supported by passages that are clearly
worded, these become stipulations to their power. Victor’s dedication to natural
philosophy affects him in a similar way; solitude is necessary to perfect his craft at first,
but it drives him into figurative, melancholic (Shelley 69) and finally literal isolation
(126-127), so that the initial necessity of solitude becomes an irretractable commitment.
The death of Elizabeth at Geneva and resulting pursuit of the monster also recalls to
readers the reason that Christian preachers were advised not to marry. Hobbes explains
that this custom was a matter of practicality rather than purity, because early Christian
preachers were often “forced to fly from one country to another” and “the care of wife
and children” put them all at risk (Hobbes 4.46.34). Had Elizabeth survived, Victor
would either have been bound to Geneva or have had to take her with him, and given the
way the monster travels this would have made Victor’s pursuit impossible (Shelley 173).
In this way Victor’s resemblance to the celibate clergy is essential to the plot of the novel,
giving him motivation (revenge rather than devotion) and ability. Victor’s nomadic
existence also makes him more priest-like; he wanders from town to town alone, travels
the wilderness of Russia, and is led by faith like the Jews in Exodus (172-173). As Victor
says to Walton:
a spirit of good followed and directed my steps, and, when I most murmured,
would suddenly extricate me from seemingly insurmountable difficulties.
Sometimes, when nature, overcome by hunger, sunk under the exhaustion, a
repast was prepared for me in the desert, that restored and inspirited me. The fare
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was indeed coarse … but I may not doubt that it was set there by the spirits that I
had invoked to aid me (173).
While the predominant religious overtones of the 1831 edition are distant from
Victor’s character in the 1818 text (Butler 199), Victor’s lack of religious observance and
superstition actually serves to make him more priest-like in a Hobbesian reading. His
indifference to solitude and darkness, comfort in churchyards and respectful observance
of decay are vigil-like (during his studies), making him appear to be someone accustomed
with last rites and funerary procedure (Shelley 33). Hobbes says that superstitions
regarding the dead proceed from the belief that the soul is immortal and therefore can be
subjected to eternal suffering, and that the duties of priests are inventions that exploit
these superstitions (Hobbes 4.44.16). Such is the power of exorcism already discussed.
Victor’s admission that he does not share in any of these superstitions makes him capable
of flaunting them without fear of the consequences; as a result, he walks in churchyards
(Shelley 33) visits “charnel houses,” and sits vigils with the dead, with all the confidence
of a man of God that believes in both the matter of superstitions and the remedy he has
against them (34). The belief that souls are “walking abroad, especially in places
consecrated, solitary, or dark” is enough to keep the truly superstitious clear of them, and
gives the priesthood the ‘powers’ to consecrate the ground, and to exorcise, conjure, or
invoke the deceased, because they believe they can, and there is no real spirit there to
demonstrate they cannot (Hobbes 4.44.16). Superstition creates a fearful thing in the
priest’s mind, but an equal measure of faith dismisses it from thence, vanquishing the
‘reality’ of it. To the average person who believes, a man that flouts such a persuasive
superstition has all the outward appearance of one that they believe has the power to
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overcome it. Victor’s desensitization to religion effectively makes him appear more
religious (4.46.18).
Randel also links the historical relevance of Geneva to revolutionary thought and
most of the novel’s violence to politically significant events there. Although the link
between Victor and Ingolstadt points to the university town as the main source of
seditious thinking, it cannot be overlooked that Victor also shares the birthplace of the
“deeply flawed but uniquely prophetic…intellectual father of the French Revolution,”
Jean-Jacques Rousseau (Randel 469). If locating Victor’s higher education in Ingolstadt
is to draw a parallel between Victor and Weishaupt in his university days, his birth and
early education in Geneva are a clear to link to Rousseau, “whose ‘writings mainly
contributed to mature’ the revolution of France as well as Geneva” (471).
Among the revolutionary events that took place in Geneva that Shelley draws on in
her novel, the death of William is the most geographically significant, as his murder at
Plainpalais “establishes an equation between the monster’s murders and revolutionary
violence” (471). Plainpalais was the site of Geneva’s greatest instance of revolutionary
violence where, after “[a] Revolutionary Tribunal… without credible judicial proceedings
or evidence of violation of law,” four public officials, two former public officials (who
held the same position as Alphonse Frankenstein) and five other persons were executed
(470). The wrongful execution of Justine for William’s death is attributed to the reaction
to these executions, as less than two months after the eleven were killed, four men
became “scapegoats” as “Geneva recoiled against radical excesses” (472). This backlash
against the initial revolutionary proceedings also shares the sense of injustice that is felt
for Justine, as the judges of the second tribunal were “implicat[ed]… in the crimes for
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which they condemned the defendants” who participated in the first (472). The similarity
continues, as Randel casts Elizabeth’s testimony and Victor’s silence at Justine’s trial as a
representation of the “two thousand” women who tried to intervene on behalf of the
accused at this tribunal, because “the experiment was too dangerous for men to engage
in”; as in the novel, this attempt at swaying the judges was unsuccessful (473). Even
though it would be enough to say that these events have always been attributed to the
political radicalism of Rousseau (for which Victor inherits blame based on the parallel
already drawn for him as the ‘father’ of the creature), Shelley reinforces Rousseau’s
culpability for the violence of revolutionary actors by modelling the creature’s scheme
after an episode from Rousseau’s life (474). Rousseau admitted that as a young man he
stole a ribbon, allowing a young servant to bear the consequence, which he says
“betrayed her into a life of misery and friendlessness” which Shelley imitates in the
creature’s theft of the miniature from William’s corpse, and subsequently planting it on
Justine, allowing her to take the punishment for his murder (474). The fact that the
monster frames Justine and Victor remains silent at her trial shows them both to be at
fault, and also shows that Shelley holds Rousseau to be as much to blame for the actions
of the revolutionaries he inspired as he was for this more personal story (474). Victor,
modelled to an extent after Rousseau, inherits the association with revolutionary violence.
The culmination of all of these traits is that Victor, who would have himself
considered more than the father of his abominations, becomes a gaunt, pale man “among
the unhallowed damps of the grave” and in his “workshop of filthy creation” (Shelley
36). His employments increase his similarity to those Hobbes would condemn as
“ecclesiastics” or “ghostly fathers” who “walk in [obscure doctrine]… monasteries… and
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churchyards” and their fictional counterparts, the “Fairies and ghosts [that] inhabit
darkness, solitudes and graves” (Hobbes 4.47.24). The aspects of Victor’s character that
correspond to Hobbes’ anti-Catholic rhetoric function in a similar way to Burke’s antirevolutionary rhetoric. Where Hobbes would approve of Victor’s materialism (which
Burke would condemn) his methodology is overshadowed by the language and subject
matter of the gothic form, which is steeped in the superstition and mysticism he despises
in the Catholic Church. Victor’s potential –as a symbol for rational science to be
corrupted and stand for institutionalized fear or superstition– is the greatest threat he
poses to Hobbesian philosophy. Where a strong leadership under sovereignty is
conducive to the peace progressive minds need to flourish, institutions like the Roman
Catholic Church divide loyalties in the state, and exploit the weak minds of the masses,
threatening to plunge a nation into civil war. The threat that Victor poses to Burke as a
materialist philosophe is more or less the same, but instead of an individual corrupted at
the institutionalized level, Burke sees individualism as the corrupting force. Victor’s
ambition puts him at odds with the soul of nationhood, the romantic ideal of selfless
devotion to king and history, as progressive individuals pose a threat to all benefits
enshrined in the monarchic system. Yet, Shelley portrays Victor sympathetically,
demonstrating to readers that their fears do not necessarily have to be demonized.
When Shelley re-introduces the creature on Mont Blanc this textual interplay,
combining the imagery of conservative writers and the mentality of enlightenment
thinkers, is reflected in the appearance of the creature. Victor “had selected [the
creature’s] features to be beautiful,” but despite his intentions “these luxuriances only
[form] a more horrid contrast” with Victor’s intentions (Shelley 39), and are even more at
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odds with the creature’s capacity for eloquence. This encounter allows Shelley’s
contemporaries to engage both sides of the political rhetoric, simultaneously
acknowledging it as monstrous and sympathetic as Victor’s confrontation with his double
becomes more nuanced. Such a meeting of political ideas and tropes could be unsettling
for a dogmatic reader of political thought. By the time Shelley stages the confrontation,
her audience has already made assumptions about the nature of the monster; his
intelligence, origins, and wanton destruction, but the creature’s dialogue with
Frankenstein subverts these assumptions. The creature’s sympathetic demeanor,
articulateness, and story of his own ‘origins’ after he left Victor at Ingolstadt are designed
to shock audiences into a re-evaluation the creature.
The creature’s origin narrative on Mont Blanc also showcases the creature’s
developmental background, which is a central element of “Enlightenment treatments of
natural law” (Reese 49). The structural framework of the account plots the creature’s
progress “from pure unsorted sense perception to the formulation of ideas, and eventually
to the attainment of literacy” in a way similar to the “Eighteenth century ‘philosophical
fictions’” that were used as extended metaphors for the advance of human society (49).
Reese credits John Locke as the inspiration for the thematic movement from the senses to
comprehension (49) whose work on the subject was a source of inspiration for Percy
Bysshe Shelley’s poem “Mont Blanc,” in which he struggles to reconcile Locke’s theory
of knowledge (that matter has an inherent quality which is separate from the qualities
attributed to it in the human mind) (Kapstein 1047) and Godwin’s theory of necessity,
which maintains that all existence is merely “an indissoluble chain” of causality devoid of
moral characteristics (1055). Both systems of thought are conformable to a materialist
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world view and echo Hobbes’ mechanical theory concerning human behaviour. Hobbes
states:
The original of them all, is that which we call SENSE, for there is no conception
in man’s mind which hath not at first, totally or by parts, been begotten upon the
organs of sense. The rest are derived from that original…The cause of sense, is
the external body, or object, which presseth against the organ proper to each
sense, either immediately… or mediately…which pressure, by the mediation of
the nerves, and other strings, and membranes of the body, continued inwards to
the brain and heart[.] (Hobbes 1.1.2, 4)
to show that all thoughts are delicate impressions on the mind that originate outside of the
body, and that no thing which we can conceive of originates independently of sense. This
belief that all conscious thought is reactionary is the principle statement of Hobbes’
determinism and leads to Godwin’s theory of necessity, which presupposes that “in the
events of the material universe everything is subjected to necessity” (Godwin 158). This
theory extends to the characters of men, which are only “the result of a long series of
sense impressions, communicated to his mind and modifying it in a certain manner”
(161). This theory, in Godwin’s reasoning, abolishes the construct of free will, and
reveals that we never act freely, as we are shaped entirely by our environment (168), and
must always act according to necessity (245). For a time, Percy and Godwin shared this
materialist viewpoint, based on the “French materialists of the Enlightenment, who
apotheosized l’homme machine” an image that Mary Shelley would develop into an
antagonist (Oakes 64). In his poem “Mont Blanc,” Percy struggles with Locke’s theory
especially, which emphasizes that what we perceive to be our own intuitive
interpretations of the world around us are in reality the secondary characteristics of
external matter, which imperceptibly impress upon us what we take to be spontaneous
insights of our own making (Kapstein 1048). At the same time, the “ambiguity and
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obscurity of the poem” shows that he refuses to entirely accept “the substantial existence
of the material universe,” because to do so would be an adoption of both Locke’s theory
of knowledge and Godwin’s necessity, which would require that he admit “that his
mind…like everything else in nature, [is] passive” and has no real part in conceiving
original ideas, only interpreting information (1052). Although Percy “had not yet rejected
materialism” (1058), he maintained that, on some level, the mind “is mysteriously free
and creates to some degree the objects of its knowledge” (1048). The outcome of reading
the novel in light of these philosophies would be a more sympathetic reading of the
creature, who can claim to be a product of his environment more than anyone considering
the rapid development of his mind and the singular treatment he receives from humanity
after he is abandoned. These deterministic theories, wherein all action originates outside
the body, highlight an external locus of control or determinism, and imply that the
individual only reacts to an outward assault of stimuli (Herbert 36). The sense that events
are beyond the control of the individual is reflected in the sense of helplessness that
underlies Hobbes’ political theory, where the natural state of man leaves him constantly
vulnerable, and also shapes the a-moralistic outcome of Godwin’s necessity, where
everything that happens is merely the inevitable outcome of an event lost to memory.
Even the actions that we feel to be evil are as natural an outcome as the effects of gravity
(Kapstein 1055). The relevance of “Mont Blanc” to the setting of Shelley’s novel would
suggest that the crimes of the creature are, at most, the necessary culmination of events
that preceded Victor’s birth, and therefore unimpeachable.
More importantly, readers recognize that their presumption of the creature’s innate
monstrosity aligns them with tertiary characters of his story, obliging them to accept that
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they judged him prematurely. For example, they might relate to the frightened shepherd
and recognize their own cowardice in the face of the unknown (Shelley 83). Reading the
story from Victor’s perspective, they would picture themselves taking up arms against the
creature, but when the creature gives its own account of the tale, readers might recast
themselves among the villagers who attacked the creature, and acknowledge that they
were previously willing to join in tormenting the innocent, sympathetic figure (83).
Reflecting on their initial response to the creature (in light of discovering that it is a
sympathetic, thinking being) should be unsettling to opponents of the Revolution,
because they would be forced to acknowledge their own susceptibility to mob mentality,
especially at a time when the reasoning powers of women and children (who rally the
village against the creature) were undervalued (83). The elite might interpret this mass
hysteria as the folly of the masses, but it is such a human reaction that everyone has
probably reflected on how easily s/he can be pressured to act irrationally. Those who
supported the Revolution might similarly have to come to terms with the image of Felix,
who attacks the creature that he had unknowingly called “good spirit, wonderful” and
benefitted from in ways he did not know (91). Some revolutionaries might have even
been brought to wonder whether they acted hastily, as it was well-known that “Louis XVI
had been above all a reformer… [already ushering in] Religious toleration, the abolition
of torture…Habeas Corpus, freedom of the press” and acknowledged, as Burke had, that
“the ancient régime in 1789 was at its most enlightened” (Elton 10). These advancements
notably took a step backwards during the Terror, just as Felix, seemingly a member of the
upper-middle class in the revolutionary government, faces a trial that is a mockery of
justice (Shelley 98) and loses everything trying to undo the injustice he sees (101).

60

Similar to the way Shelley leads readers to re-evaluate their assumptions about the
nature of Victor’s creature, Shelley also calls into question whether the senses can be
trusted to present us with the whole truth. The reactions of secondary characters to the
creature’s appearance are often entirely inappropriate if they understood his intentions, as
demonstrated by Felix’s assumption that the creature is attacking his father while it is
prostrating itself and begging for help (110). In contrast, his father is more ‘enlightened’
by his blindness because he must privilege reason rather than vision. This representation
of blindness leading to understanding is the most contradictory to the popularly accepted
motif of light representing enlightenment, and challenges the whole system of images in
the novel, particularly Victor’s pronouncement that “from the midst of the darkness a
sudden light broke in upon [him]” when he discovers the secret of reanimation (34). Of
course, the reality is that he deludes himself and is so caught up in the details of ‘seeing’
that he blinds himself to his occupation for two years (39).
Randel and others suggest that by having Victor’s creature born at Ingolstadt, Shelley
“accepts [Barruel’s] metaphoric equivalence between the French Revolution and the
monster” but does not entirely support his demonization of Enlightenment era thinking
(Randel 467). Ronald Paulson confirms this reading, pointing out how the term
“illuminé” was applied to several ideas by individuals both in favour of and against the
revolution, often in “diametrically opposed ways” for both “right and wrong, [or] as royal
authority and as human liberty” (Paulson 549). Shelley’s intention is therefore
ambiguous, although Paulson tends toward the reading that imagery associated with light
corresponds to enlightenment thinking or education. It might be for this reason that
Paulson also chooses to read Weishaupt into the character of M. Waldman. Weishaupt
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makes the assertion that “The labours of men of Genius, however erroneously directed,
scarcely ever fail in ultimately turning to the advantage of mankind” (546). Paulson
deems this sentiment fitting for the Illuminati, who “were sworn to further knowledge for
the betterment of mankind, no matter what the cost or means” (546). Paulson also
identifies several instances of light imagery corresponding with education, including
when Victor reads alchemical works as a boy, and when he learns the nature of “lightning
electricity as… utterly destructive” when it destroys “an old and beautiful oak” (549). If
these images are symbolic, they are also instances of foreshadowing, as they come before
Victor is enrolled at Ingolstadt and both happen under foreboding circumstances, as
Victor only “chanced to find a volume of the works of Cornelius Agrippa” because of bad
weather (Shelley 22), and the lightning storm comes to Geneva “from behind the
mountains of Jura” (24) to the northeast (the direction of Ingolstadt). The claim that
imagery like this is meant to be taken as symbolic of the Illuminati is difficult to support,
as it precedes any mention of Ingolstadt, the primary link between the novel and
Barruel’s conspiracy theory (17); but there are clear links between these images and the
monarchic system, as Paulson points out that the image of the oak struck by lightning
resonates well with the image of the “British Oak” (Paulson 550) a long-standing symbol
of the British monarchy since Hobbes’ time, when Charles II hid himself in an oak tree
after his father’s execution (Weber 508). It is tempting to read the lightning strike as a
metaphor for the Enlightenment overcoming the aristocracy, and if the oak is read to
stand as the strength of the monarchy –as it has been traditionally– then it would appear
that Shelley has taken a definite stance in favour of Revolution.
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While the birthplace of the creature implies that he is representative of revolutionaries,
it is no less true that the monarchic system is equally discredited as the opposite force.
For example, where Victor’s education at Ingolstadt might be interpreted as symbolic of
seditious thought by conservatives, the opposite system –traditional monarchic rule–
naturally falls to the “exploded systems” of Magnus and Paracelsus (Shelley 29). Thus
the system that opposes the “enlightened and scientific age,” which conservative thinkers
like Burke validate by virtue of being “a thousand years old,” are forced to feel their age
when M. Krempe calls them “as musty as they are ancient” (29). More to the point, no
system in the novel is guiltless, as a serious reader will point out that the older,
invalidated systems of natural philosophy inspire Victor to create new life, and
Enlightenment science makes it possible. One cannot be blamed without recognizing the
responsibility of the other; the new system can be considered an offense to the ‘divine’
monarchy or traditional government, but if the monarchy had appealed to the majority of
subjects, they might not have felt rebellion was necessary. As Paine asserts that it was the
aristocracy and the “parental callousness of primogeniture… [that was] the true parent of
the Revolution” “rather than any innovators or Illuminati” (Baldick 21).
While supporters of the Revolution like Wollstonecraft and Paine, who point to “the
negligence of the decadent and over-refined French court” and other practices of the
aristocracy (21), applaud the revolutionaries for rebelling against “the despotic principles
of government… in the original establishment, many centuries back” (Paine RM 97) and
praise this rebellion as the height of dispassionate reason they would be challenged to
explain the treatment of Louis XVI. Burke’s criticism that the French revolutionaries
“rebel[led] against a mild and lawful monarch” (Burke Ref 18) and the reality that “the
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Revolution… was not directed against Louis XVI at all[,] it was directed against Louis
XIV, le roi soleil, and Louis XV” (Elton 10) makes one ask: if Paine argues that a nation
should not be unfairly bound by the rulings of former governments, why should a
moderate king be hated for the behaviour of his predecessors while he is in the midst of
beneficial reforms? When both are laid side by side, neither is apparently just or
reasonable, and it is in the struggle between Shelley’s title character and his creation that
these issues are considered together in the minds of Shelley’s readers.
There is a further connection between this observation of rebellion against a moderate
ruler and Victor. While Victor is in Geneva, his father is clearly described as a
benevolent, even-handed and loving father, making him an ideal ‘type’ of the benevolent
ruler, whereas Clerval’s father seems only introduced to the text to show that he is
holding his son back from higher education and enlightenment out of obstinacy (Shelley
27-28). The figure of the benevolent ruler in political philosophy is often perceived as
destined to fail. King Louis XVI was acknowledged to be the “most enlightened” and
moderate ruler in France’s memory, but the Revolution took place in his lifetime, because
such rebellions “do not come from the down-trodden. Revolutions come from those who
have newly tasted power and find that it is good” (Elton 10-11). While Victor takes no
direct action against his father in Shelley’s novel, his father’s laissez-faire style of childrearing “continually engaged [Victor] in endeavoring to bestow mutual pleasure” within
his “secluded and domestic” family unit (Shelley 28). This lack of socialization outside of
people committed to his happiness is undoubtedly why Victor has an “invincible
repugnance to new countenances” and lacks the tools to “make [his] own friends, and be
[his] own protector” (28). Victor’s idyllic socialization in Geneva leads to his voluntary
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withdrawal to the fringes of society in Ingolstadt. With only a limited ability or interest to
forge human relationships he is left without balance in his life. Here he engages only in
the pure sciences that interest him, but there is no supervision, censure or moral center to
point out the obvious ethical lines he is crossing. . His idyllic childhood, devoid of the
traditional horror stories used to frighten children into behaving also leaves him without
the ethical basis that would have kept him from straying later (33). This issue of
fatherhood and paternal influences shall be taken up again in the following chapter.
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Chapter 4
Patriarchy, Compact, and Rebellion
From birth, Mary Shelley was surrounded by influential and brilliant individuals, all
of whom were radical philosophers, supporters of revolution, and disestablishmentarians.
As a result Frankenstein is, above all else, a political novel in which she has responded to
the philosophies that informed her upbringing. However, as a radical among radicals
Shelley’s novel stands as evidence that she freely questions and disagrees with as many
opinions held by her mother, father, and husband as she accepts, which has led to a novel
not written to one political end, or even in one voice. Even more problematic for
establishing a consistent political interpretation is that Shelley’s rebelliousness manifests
between editions of her novel. Whereas both her parents and her husband “consistently
defended the radical perspective” in their writings, Shelley blends these with
“contradictory perspectives” that reflect her own conservatism (Bowerbank 418). Despite
the Shelleys’ early attempts to live according to a blend of Godwinian and
Wollstonecraftian programs, Mary Shelley’s thinking grew more conservative as time
moved on (418). Marilyn Butler notes changes between the 1818 text and the 1831
edition that show a trend towards conservatism, including making the work more
religious, dissolving Victor’s ties to “materialist science” (Butler 199) and purging lines
that echo her father’s opinions (200). She does so notably by cutting Elizabeth’s line
denouncing retributive justice as “executioners, their hands yet reeking with blood of
innocence, [believing] they have done a great deed” (Shelley 67) and replacing it with
thoroughly religious sentiment, “Learn from me, dear lady, to submit in patience to the
will of Heaven!” (Butler 218). The nature of the changes made between editions either
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show that her opinions changed as she matured, or that, as the influences of her circle
weakened, she felt freer to express her opinions (Oakes 66). As shown in chapter two,
political tensions in Europe were mostly between the radical thinkers who sought to
promote democracy and independence and the supporters of conservative patriarchal
institutions. As the novel internalizes this struggle, it makes sense that paternal
relationships play a key part in the novel, as the family unit is the basis of the oldest
patriarchal constitutions, and thus demonstrates the most basic example of rebellion –the
tension between parents and children. This chapter focusses on the difficult father-child
relationships in Frankenstein as an obvious symbol of revolutionary conflict against
established authority. The secondary focus is on Godwin’s political influence as Shelley’s
surviving parent, which seems appropriate as the novel was dedicated to him, and the
novel serves as the outlet through which Shelley espoused personal criticisms of her
father and his philosophy. In a sense, the novel is her rebellion against Godwin’s moral
and political philosophy as much as it engages questions of contemporary political
organization and rebellion in Europe.
The representation of fathers in the novel is crucial: four father-child relationships
among the main characters is proof that Shelley meant to draw attention to the various
iterations, but the relationship between Shelley and her own father, or more appropriately
her father and his ideology, has more influence on the story. Victor’s materialism –which
was a major concern of the previous chapter –is shown most notably in his account of
occupying churchyards, an engagement he directly associates with his father’s
educational program which allowed no room for superstition (Shelley 33). Victor, of
course, did not choose this program for himself as a child, when he eagerly consumed all
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manners of occult and pseudoscientific material, which his father denounces, telling
Victor “do not waste your time upon this; it is sad trash” (23). The difference of interest
between Victor and Alphonse is one of the earliest conflicts in Shelley’s novel, and the
most palpable contradiction: that Victor’s interests are dismissed by his father, leaving
him to secretly educate himself (23). Victor’s boast that he had never “feared the
apparition of a spirit” (33) implies a disbelief in the supernatural, despite his open
acknowledgement that he attempted to raise ghosts as one of his childhood pursuits (24).
Despite Alphonse’s disapproval, Victor’s decision to proceed in secret shows that he has
a rebellious streak, for which he avoids taking responsibility by blaming his father’s
unsatisfactory explanation (23). His rebellion also foreshadows the activities he will
engage in as an adult, when he will –again– implicate Alphonse’s desire that his son have
nothing to do with the supernatural or arcane, as a driving force towards Victor’s pursuit
of the same. This tone is revisited at Ingolstadt where his professor M. Krempe asks him
“in what desert land have you lived, where no one was kind enough to inform you that
these fancies… are a thousand years old, and as musty as they are ancient?” (29).
Krempe’s comment is worded similarly to Victor’s semi-accusatory lament, that if
Alphonse “had taken the pains to explain to [him], that the principles of Agrippa had
been entirely exploded, and that a modern system of science had been introduced…under
such circumstances, [he] should certainly have thrown Agrippa aside” (23). The
similarity of Victor’s lament to Walton to M. Krempe’s derision indicates that Victor still
blames his father for not guiding him away from the knowledge that inspired his monster.
The reality is that Victor’s self-indoctrination in the supernatural as a boy is a better
explanation for his lack of apprehension as an adult; but the reason that Shelley provides
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points to Alphonse’s aggressive response to superstition as the cause. The relationship
between Victor and Alphonse is part of a systemic tension between fathers and children
in the novel, also evidenced by Walton’s father, who tried to prevent him from taking to
the sea on his death-bed (which Walton’s uncle kept trying to thwart in memory of his
brother) (6); Henry Clerval’s overbearing father (28); the Turkish merchant and his
daughter Safie (101); and even Victor’s mother Caroline, who is forced to support her
father when his injured pride forces them into friendless destitution, rather than accepting
Alphonse’s help (18-19). The tensions between fathers and children are dioramas of the
discord in the patriarchic systems of Europe during a period of increasing
democratization. The struggle of each child is against a father that represents an
established way of thinking; Walton desires to expand the frontiers of human exploration
(6), Clerval would prefer to expand the boundaries of his own understanding (27-28),
Safie claims control over her romantic future (102), and Victor alternatively blames his
father for a lack of guidance and refuses to obey him in his quest to overcome the
boundaries of life and death. The tension between Victor and his father originates in his
father’s materialism, as his quickness to explain the properties of lightning (24) and
enroll Victor in classes of natural philosophy (25) are instances that point to his support
for a materialist world view at odds with his son’s fixation on the romantic. Butler notes
that the nature of Victor’s education changes in the 1831 edition so that Alphonse is less
scientific; thus, Alphonse is incapable rather than unwilling to redirect Victor’s interests,
lessening his responsibility proportionately to Victor’s, whose interest in alchemy is
reduced to “a childish enthusiasm” (Butler 198). While Butler attributes this change to an
effort to secure the third printing of a novel that had already attracted too much negative
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attention, the change in the familial dynamic seems as pronounced as the change in
scientific motivation, when only the scientific element was offensive enough to merit
censorship (l). These changes demonstrate that Shelley connects the scientific
responsibility for Victor’s experiment to Alphonse’s degree of paternal responsibility,
and lessening Victor’s guilt necessitated a more moderate treatment of his father. In the
1818 text, she deliberately highlights the difference between paradigms of father and
child as a fundamental cause of the tragedy about to occur but, by the time she reaches
her third edition (where Godwin’s radicalism is the least accentuated and her own
conservatism most strongly pronounced), Victor and Alphonse are pardoned to an extent,
and the tension between them is diminished.
Frankenstein’s treatment of overbearing fathers in 1818 is gently handled. Alphonse’s
desire to keep Victor from alchemical authors and superstitious/religious themes is not
rooted in malice, but rather because he sees them as an irrelevant waste of time (Shelley
23). Clerval’s father believes “that learning [is] superfluous in the commerce of ordinary
life” despite Henry’s desire to “possess a cultivated understanding” (Shelley 28).
Clerval’s father thinks he is discouraging Henry from wasting his time in a meaningless
pursuit, like Alphonse does with Victor, so that he can learn a practical trade and take
over the family business (28). The character of Clerval’s father becomes less sympathetic
in the 1831 edition, when Shelley changes his motivation from being an extension of “his
favorite theory” (similar to Godwin as a philosopher with lofty ideals) (28) to being
“narrow-minded” (Butler 212). Clerval’s own opinion of his fate changes: whereas in the
1818 text he is “well pleased” to become his father’s partner (Shelley 28), in the 1831
text Shelley states that Henry “deeply felt the misfortune of being debarred from a liberal
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education,” highlighting the frustration of being under his father’s rule (Butler 212). The
only overbearing father who is demonized in the 1818 version (Victor’s relationship with
his creature is not properly fatherhood as he takes no role in rearing or educating it) is the
Turkish merchant, who rejects the idea of Safie marrying a Christian (Shelley 100).
According to the creature’s account, Safie’s desire to marry Felix is mingled with a
desire for the freedom to exercise her mind beyond “puerile amusements” and “take a
rank in society,” despite her father’s religious stance (99). Shelley’s use of the word
“puerile” in such close association with the religion of “Mahomet” is a direct nod to her
mother’s work, A Vindication of the Rights of Women, where Wollstonecraft describes (in
her second chapter) the debased existence of women who are “kept in ignorance under
the specious name of innocence” (Wollstonecraft 19). Once again, this relationship is in
keeping with the overall trend of fathers exercising inappropriate or biased control over
the education of their children. Shelley further uses this account to fictionalize some of
Mary Wollstonecraft’s argument for the betterment of women’s education. The image
that Safie dreads, of being “immured within the walls of a harem” (Shelley 99), is one of
Rousseau’s recommendations for the education of women; in Vindication of the Rights of
Women, Wollstonecraft quotes his proposal that rather than learning the activities that
were traditionally impressed on young women, Rousseau thinks that women should
develop the talents that will make her more “pleas[ing to] her future husband” and “fit her
for a Harem of an Eastern bashaw” (Wollstonecraft 85-86). Wollstonecraft responds that
this course of study would be antithetical to his own observation that the impression of a
person’s physical attractiveness will diminish within a year of marriage (90). If beauty
will fade so quickly, then the talents of a harem girl will quickly lose interest as well (90).
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Shelley’s depiction of Safie’s mother being captured and sold into a harem for her
beauty recalls Wollstonecraft and Godwin’s impressions of marriage: Godwin calls
marriage a “despotic and artificial means… [of maintaining the] possession of a woman”
and “the most odious selfishness” (Godwin 303), and Wollstonecraft –although she does
not outright condemn marriage– likens it to the social institution of absolute monarchy,
and says that “[the] divine right of husbands” deserves to be challenged equally to the
divine right of kings (Wollstonecraft 41). Both of these depictions highlight (from the
perspectives of radical Jacobin writers) the arbitrary and oppressive nature of the
relationship, which Shelley illustrates as literal entrapment. Wollstonecraft’s problem
with the institution of marriage is not the union of man and wife per se, but that men too
often overvalue the most basic qualities of women, and that men who are enthralled with
the idea of “a pretty, useful companion, without a mind” not only degrade the woman, but
are themselves reduced to being “sunk in the brute,” or deprived of real company (90).
The only male figure in the novel who truly appreciates the “charm of life” and
appreciates that “nothing pleases us more than to observe in [others] a fellow-feeling with
all the emotions of our own breast” is “the brute” (Shelley 90). The monster’s plea for a
mate “as hideous as himself” in whom he can “excite sympathy” is both a mature and
progressive request, and shows that his miserable condition does make him more attuned
to the necessities of life that Paine and Godwin felt society would corrupt (Shelley 120).
The creature’s ugliness also makes him more sensitive to the plight of Shelley’s female
contemporaries, as “the violence of Rousseau’s general will… disavow[ed] ‘the ‘private
sphere’ of female nonsubjects, slaves, and servants’” as his appearance is only
“represent[ative of] broader normative injunctions about values which unite individuals
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into a community”(Rivlin-Beenstock 206). Among the human beings in the novel,
Shelley has seen fit to provide several examples of married life. All of the marriages
(with the exception of Safie’s mother) glorify the women’s good qualities: Safie
demonstrates independence and marries for love, Caroline Beaufort is an industrious
woman who supports her father (19) and has a husband who displays “gratitude and
worship in his attachment to [his wife]” by the third edition of the novel when Shelley rewrites him significantly to make his marriage seem less out of homosocial obligation
(Butler 204). Even young Victor “[looks] upon Elizabeth as… [his] to protect, love, and
cherish” (again, by the third edition, after he was rewritten to take a greater interest)
(Butler 207). Men in the story are thus shown to progress less rapidly than the creature in
many ways.
Yet Shelley goes further to express her mother’s feminist perspective: by saying that
Safie’s mother “won the heart of [her] father” (Shelley 99), she takes power from the man
and re-writes the merchant’s choice to marry her as a feminine initiative, despite the basis
of the attraction being physical (99). Wollstonecraft acknowledges this argument in
Vindication, that women were gaining power over men by playing to masculine desires
“like Turkish bashaws” and manipulating their would-be masters, but Wollstonecraft
ends this point by denouncing the fruits of their cunning as “temporary gratifications” at
the cost of their virtue (Wollstonecraft 40). Shelley completes the transformation of male
prerogative into female initiative in the relationship between Safie and Felix, as Felix is
first attracted by Safie’s beauty, but is won over completely after Safie “[finds] means to
express her thoughts” [emphasis mine] in an act where Felix is neither the instigator nor
neglector of her feelings (Shelley 99). Safie’s decision to follow her lover into exile is
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also made independently. Furthermore, her adventure is exclusively female: she is
attended by a woman from Leghorn and it is the “woman of the house” who takes her in
when her attendant dies in Germany (102). Safie’s adventure is a very strong portrayal of
a woman overcoming obstacles for which she was never trained, and Safie’s letters to
Felix demonstrate a confident “forwardness” that Shelley would have believed
characteristic of her mother (Rubenstein 190).
Safie’s choice to follow her mother’s wishes for her spiritual and educational wellbeing, then, is conflated with her elopement with Felix; this decision not only makes
Safie’s bold move to escape her father more illustrative of her independence, but it
recasts the marriage as means to an intellectual end (Shelley 102) rather than “thoughtless
and romantic youth” pairing off on the basis of a few encounters (Godwin 302). Safie’s
account has already been read by other critics as a fictionalized parallel of Mary’s
elopement with Percy, with Safie’s mother playing the part of Mary Wollstonecraft,
encouraging her daughter to “aspire to higher powers of intellect” through A Vindication
of the Rights of Women (Rubenstein 169). This re-writing of Mary’s elopement with
Percy would not lessen the sting of betrayal Godwin felt (Butler xi), but does attempt to
reframe it in philosophically justifiable terms. Although Godwin had openly declaimed
marriage as an evil that would be best to abolish (Godwin 303), he had hypocritically
married twice –the second time to Mary Jane Clairmont, who had an “uneven
relationship” with young Mary Shelley (Butler ix). Between this antagonistic feminine
authority and “patriarchy run riot” that characterized paternal authority in Shelley’s time
(Bell 59), the drive to leave home must have been equal to being unbearably cloistered,
and the Shelleys undoubtedly viewed their relationship as an intellectual engagement,
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“sealed by their enthusiastic reading of her mother’s and father’s books” (Turner Sharp
78).
Alphonse’s influence over his son’s education in the 1818 text has very clearly led to
atheistic materialism in his son, despite Victor’s former interest in the supernatural; this
parallels Godwin’s childhood to an extent. Godwin’s father was a “dissenting minister,”
(Bell 52) –part of a tradition of religious teaching with a politically radical message in
favour of the anti-monarchic “voice of the English Revolution” that had opposed the
return of Charles II to the throne (53). Godwin himself characterized Cromwell’s rule as
“usurpation,” implying his own lack of support for the parliamentary position (Godwin
100). Although Godwin “trained for the ministry” and accepted “the title of ‘Reverend’”
after his own father’s example (Bell 52), early exposure to “Rousseau and the French
materialists” and his consequent loss of faith compelled him to withdraw from ministry
(Carter xi). Godwin’s early reading would likely have met with the same disapproval
from his religious father that Alphonse showed to Victor’s reading (Shelley 23). The
political message of his father’s faith served as the foundation for Godwin’s own radical
political perspective, and survived his conversion to atheism as “deep-ingrained habits of
thought” (Bell 52). The moral sensibility of the dissenting ministers, that it is proper to
“set the interests of God above those of the family,” seemingly caused an uncomfortable
relationship between Godwin and his father (53). This highly moralized upbringing,
combined with the materialist philosophy of an atheist, provided the foundation for his
utilitarianism. Godwin believed that “right behaviour is to be determined by applying the
criterion of utility to each individual act” (Carter xiii).
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Godwin’s utilitarianism caused him “to look for the future benefits of society and
place these above the claims of personal interest” (Bell 53). As a rational philosophy,
Godwin’s utilitarianism led him to argue in Political Justice that personal attachments
should be secondary to achieving the greatest possible utility, to the extent that, if given
the choice to sacrifice a family member in order to save a person of note to humanity,
there should be no compunction in saving the latter, although the family member would
surely die (Carter xix). Carter states that Godwin did not intend to imply that the agent
making the decision would not feel the pain of loss, but that he believed that “the
benevolent man…motivated in all cases by the desire to do the right thing” would be
compelled to act against his personal interest (xix). Godwin extended this scenario to the
conclusion that the family member, or any person about to perish, would also chose the
life of the person of note over their own or be unjust in demanding to be saved (Godwin
70-71). Kathleen Bell points out that Godwin loads the argument, outlining the many
vices his loved one might have, that naturally make the person of note a worthier choice,
a move that she attributes to the “assumption of recognizable moral authority” that
Godwin would have acquired in his training for ministry (Bell 53). Bell points out that
Godwin’s argument, casting the loved one as a person of note’s servant, “allows his
reader to indulge in class prejudice and assume that, in most circumstances, a servant is
of less value than a man of rank” (53). This implication of class prejudice is interesting,
since the most notable Jacobin writings usually attribute the most damnable qualities to
men of rank (Brantlinger 67). Here Godwin very clearly asserts that those men who have
a more cultivated mind are “further removed from the state of a mere animal” than the
servant, who is of lower “worth and importance than the other” (Godwin 70). This
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instance of loading every convenient vice onto the loved one or servant is more than a
slip of private prejudice, as it is part of Godwin’s larger rebuttal to Burke’s belief that
only men who understand loyalty and feel interpersonal sympathy in the form of
“domestic affection (and patriotism)” are capable “of any broad sociability” (Weston 13).
To distinguish his viewpoint from Burke’s and encourage a foundation of morality
uninfluenced by personal indebtedness, Godwin demonizes the servant or familial
representative (Godwin 71). This “apparently heartless rejection of instinctive domestic
attachments” roused the public imagination against him, and coloured their opinion of his
utilitarian system (Weston 2).
In his introduction to Godwin’s Political Justice, K. Codell Carter defends Godwin’s
rationality by arguing that he never meant the good and rational man to be entirely
dispassionate and emotionless, but that he meant for “every act… [to] be accompanied
by… compassion and sympathy” for humanity in general, effectively treating all people
with the same deference as blood relations (Carter xviii). Roland Weston contradicts
Carter’s interpretation, pointing out that Godwin was antagonistic to the thought of “brute
and unintelligent sympathy” as if it was infectious, spreading from person to person
without pause for rational analysis (Weston 6). Sympathy should not be such a point of
contention with Godwin, seeing as it “was characteristic of the religious and political
radicalism of the mid-seventeenth century” (7) which served as the foundation of his
training as a dissenting minister (Bell 52). Possibly, the relationship between these
political tenets and “mob violence” was a primary concern for Godwin, as any level of
cooperation, especially amongst such a disorganized body as a mob, was incompatible
with a man seeking truth via reason (Weston 7). Alternatively, Godwin’s conversion to
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atheism may have made him loathe his former religious beliefs, although it would be
difficult to rationalize such a claim considering that his radicalism (which would initially
have been a tenet of his faith as a dissenting minister) persisted. Even if Carter is correct
in assuming that Godwin’s intention was to form a philosophy espousing a universal
kinship towards mankind, in practice Godwin seemed to be less than sympathetic,
particularly to his own children. One example was his response to the death of his
grandson William; when Godwin, with “characteristic insensitivity to the suffering of
others,” criticized Mary’s grief as it reduced her in his eyes, to “the commonality and
mob of [her] sex” (Bell 58). Clearly, Carter’s interpretation that Godwin’s philosophy
leads to a nigh familial love for all of mankind (Carter xviii) might have uncomfortable
repercussions considering Godwin’s treatment of his own children (Bell 58).
Shelley uses other works to respond to Godwin’s philosophic valuation of life. In
response to Godwin’s scenario of the person of note and the servant, Shelley took the
opposite stance: that “the claims of the exceptional individual cannot be allowed to take
precedence over the sufferings of the anonymous many” just as on the occasions of her
children’s deaths, her feelings of grief were the same “necessary and morally correct
reaction” as every other human being ought to feel under the circumstances (60). Shelley
does not experience human sympathy as the rational, general, well-wishing for humanity
that Godwin envisions; nor does she reduce human experience to a list of
accomplishments. Shelley demonstrates her understanding of human sympathy as early as
the 1818 edition of Frankenstein, as the monster’s desire for a mate comes from his
desire for “the interchange of those sympathies necessary for [his] being” (Shelley 118)
that he had hoped to find with the De Laceys and quickly discovered was impossible to
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secure from human kind (109). The creature is so unlike humanity that his experiences
are unique and un-relatable, and he understands “the human senses are insurmountable
barriers” to mutual understanding and coexistence (119). To Shelley, true human
sympathy requires direct participation in the most common human responses, reducing
one to “the ‘commonality and mob’” (Bell 60). Shelley recognizes that her father’s ideal
of disinterestedness forces the onlooker to become a judge of all of humanity –setting
them apart from the people whose benefit they are deciding. For every man to have a
“conscious relationship [with]… the truth rationally discerned,” every man must be
placed in a position to pass judgment on and for each other, which is really just creating a
multitude of abstract kings (Weston 6). In this way, Godwin’s republicanism does show
men to be equal, but paradoxically in equal possession of the same negative qualities that
encouraged the Jacobins to speak out against the monarchy in the first place. What
Godwin proposes in his theory of benevolence comes from the same assumption that
Paine makes about common sense –that it is distorted by the influence governments assert
over the minds of people (Fruchtman 22). Godwin only differs from Paine in that Paine
would democratize the people; Godwin thinks government in any form is “not only
unnecessary but wholly corrupting” (Weston 6).
The ends of Godwin’s argument for individualism are, in actuality, the beginnings of
Hobbes’. Godwin’s radical reduction of government to the rule of individual conscience
is the same as Hobbes’ depiction of the state of nature, where every man can also behave
according to his own reason, except that Godwin believes optimistically that men will
behave according to peace and general benefit, rather than personal gain. Although many
of Godwin’s arguments denounce promises, covenants, governments, and all forms of
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cooperation as evil, he still believes that one can act in the interest of the general good,
and that the majority will do likewise. This trust that others will act according to anything
other than self-interest is the basis of cooperation. In the republican state Godwin
describes as a bare minimum of necessary government, there are still more problems that
arise. Godwin argues that the best scenario is where “the first business of government” is
to ensure “that no man exceeds his sphere,” which is “limited by the co-ordinate sphere
of his neighbor” (Godwin 114). Force may be used by “every man to defend himself
from violation” only in “cases of absolute necessity” (114). Godwin describes the power
of this government as a “combination of the powers of individuals to control the excesses
of each other,” which is to say, that if threatened by his neighbour it is up to each man to
defend himself, until the more ambitious or less reasonable man becomes a threat that it
will take more than one person’s power to subdue (114).
The nature of governmental power in Godwin’s republic is therefore no more than the
state of war Hobbes described in Leviathan more than one hundred years earlier (Hobbes
1.14.4-5). As if Godwin recognizes the similarity, he declares that it is up to the
community to self-police so that this cumulative force does not become despotic, which
begs the question –if the majority becomes despotic, what force is left to oppose it
(Godwin 114)? Godwin tries to further distinguish the difference between his republic
and Hobbes’ social contract or state of war by asserting that in his system a man “is
bound to nothing,” (115) because, in his view, any form of promise, or governance, is a
form of evil (although he admits sometimes a “necessary evil”) (105). Godwin envisions
that this man, “bound to nothing” will take part in civic affairs when necessary because it
is an opportunity to exercise authority in “common deliberation” and then go back to
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being “bound to nothing” (115). In Godwin’s denunciation of the socially-contracted
state, he lists among its projected reasons for failure that “human understanding…where
its independence and integrity are sufficiently preserved” renders it nearly impossible for
men to reach consensus on all of the propositions open to debate (101). So how can it
ever be expected that any “common deliberation,” in a state conceived to foster fierce
independence and cultivate higher understanding, will result in a clearer agreement,
unless it concerns only the most rudimentary issues (115)? Furthermore, this man, does
find himself “bound to nothing” as the group which came together to make a collective
decision goes back to being individuals just like himself, each “bound to nothing” (115).
He will either obey because he consented, as Godwin explains, or because he fears “that a
greater mass of evil will result from his disobedience” (115). This choice is, again, no
different from the submissive acquiescence that Godwin demonized in his chapter on the
social contract, choosing “the least evil” of two given alternatives (100). What reason,
then, is there for any man to follow any course of action proscribed by a collective?
Godwin has explained that men should break their promises if time proves that they
hinder the best use of their property of faculties (104-105); he has also declared that force
is only to be used “in cases of absolute necessity” (114). So there is no reason whatsoever
to follow a proscribed course of action. As far as Godwin asserts that promises should
never be allowed to interfere with our personal use of reason (106), what recourse is left
to the individual who finds that “common deliberation [has resulted in]… the erroneous
judgment of a whole people” –as Godwin notes that these decisions will take longer to be
overturned than even under a despotic authority (115)?

81

When the whole of it is taken together, Godwin’s system is supposed to benefit the
rational man and allow him to act according to his reason, but it equally preserves the
obstinate man by creating an environment where there is no check to his will unless he
strays into the murky area of Godwin’s thought where force becomes justifiable.
Godwin’s political theory is founded on the optimism that “rational and intelligent beings
[will act] as if they are rational and intelligent” but is as easily exploded by meeting the
average human being under prolonged duress (107). Godwin sets out to write a refutation
of Hobbesian social contract theory but, by insisting such basic forms of cooperation as
marriage, “‘common labour and common meals,’” and even planning for one’s future
happiness (“cooperation with [one’s] future [self]”) are all evil (Franta 700), he rejects
the first principle of his work, that “a state of high civilization” is the “most desirable
state of man” (Godwin 13). Godwin promotes a life without “industry; … commodities
that may be imported by sea; … no arts; no letters; no society” –in reality– one that is
“solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short” (Hobbes 1.13.9). He feebly defends his
idealized existence by countering Hobbes’ point that, without cooperation, there is “no
culture of the earth; no navigation… no instruments of moving [or] removing such things
as require much force” (1.13.9) with a Frankenstinian appeal to industrialization. Godwin
advocates that the effort to “pull down a tree, to cut a canal [or] navigate a vessel” should
be lessened by “the complicated machines of human contrivance” to reduce men’s
dependence on one another (Godwin 301).
Mary Shelley effectively rejects her father’s view of promises and the social contract
in Frankenstein, as every promise that is broken ends in calamity. Felix begins by making
a vow to the merchant that, because the miscarriage of justice is personally repulsive to
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him, he will break the merchant out of prison (Shelley 98). Godwin would laud this
decision, as it is “an obligation which arises out of no compact” but from “the irresistible
deduction from the wants of one man, and the ability of another to relieve them” (Godwin
102). Shelley has constructed this scenario as a perfect example of her father’s argument;
the governmental system in place is unjust, and Felix’s reaction is properly motivated by
an internal impression that justice must be virtuously served. If Shelley designed this
scenario to illustrate her father’s sense of moral obligation, the outcome must embody her
own view on the subject: as a result of Felix keeping his promise, he violates civil law
and the De Lacey family suffers the penalty of the state (Shelley 100-101). As Godwin
says later in his chapter on promises in Political Justice, “it is no more fitting that I
should bring upon myself calamity and death, than that I should suffer them to fall upon
another” (Godwin 109). Shelley might be cautioning her readers against blindly holding
up her father’s moral ideals without acknowledging the fact that his doctrine is also
cautious and self-interested (109).
The promise the Turkish merchant makes to Felix in return is a more complex
example of the kinds of promises that Godwin describes. Shelley has based this part of
the story more literally on an example from Enquiry Concerning Political Justice, where
Godwin states that because “we are ignorant of their principles of conduct” our dealings
with Arabs “do not afford us a sufficient security, as to the particulars of our intercourse
with them” (111). Shelley has taken the character of the Turkish merchant from this
example, and furnished the circumstances of his promise from the text immediately
around it. First, the merchant’s desire to betray Felix, and to deny him the promised
marriage of his daughter on a religious basis (Shelley 100), shows that he is “a man
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greatly deficient in delicacy of moral discrimination” because he has made a promise
insincerely, for the purpose of manipulating another (Godwin 110). However, the change
in Felix’s circumstances alters the conditions of the merchant’s promise and Godwin’s
theory absolves the merchant in this respect. In respect to seeking after the greatest
general good, keeping his promise to Felix would alleviate Felix’s pain, but from a
father’s perspective it would subject Safie to the misery of the De Lacey’s exile, and he
would feel the pain of never seeing his daughter again. When the merchant offered his
daughter to Felix he was able to provide for her, but his impoverishment makes him a
poor candidate to care for Safie now (Shelley 101). Godwin might consider the change in
Felix’s circumstances as an instance where the promise had depreciated into “a material
obstacle to utility” and as such could be knowingly broken (Godwin 110). This example
could alternatively fit under Godwin’s heading of distributing property; now that the
merchant enjoys his freedom, he can further benefit from his use of property by marrying
Safie to a wealthier suitor as part of a business arrangement should he see fit (104). Not
marrying Safie to Felix would assuredly (in her father’s reasoning) be for the greatest
good, as he can now secure better conditions for Safie, and not disadvantage himself by
marrying her to a Christian (Shelley 100).
The promise that Victor makes to the monster is of the latter kind, where “information,
afterwards acquired, persuades [the promise- maker] to violate [it]” (Godwin 110).
Victor’s decision to create the second creature is based on the promise that the monster
would leave Europe and never threaten man again. This promise was undoubtedly for the
greatest general benefit (Shelley 124), but upon Victor’s realization that the nature of the
second creature could be as volatile as the first’s, he feels it necessary to break his

84

promise rather than risk compounding the danger to humanity (138). Even if satisfying
the monster’s desire would have compelled him to leave, Victor’s reason for destroying
the second creature is according to his duty to the human race, and thus virtuous (Carter
xiii). Yet the monster has become so sympathetic up to this point and is so tortured by the
last-minute destruction of his mate that his reaction, while terrifying, is understandable
and calls Godwinian morality into question. If Felix’s motivation could be perfect, and
leave him in ruin, and the merchant’s motivations can be justifiable although they are
impure, then how is utility as laid out in Godwin’s Political Justice a desirable project?
The suffering Victor causes by breaking his compact and the revenge the monster takes
against him indicate that Shelley rejects her father’s belief that compacts are evil, and
sees that more evil results from breaking them than from making them.
Colene Bentley observes that Shelley places stock in “compacts and promises as forms
of connectivity, because she deems them important to moral action” (Bentley 346). In her
own experience, “ethical action” is not what she has seen from her father’s utilitarianism,
nor has “the possession of shared traits” ever led to a sense of community, particularly in
her personal relationship with her father (346). What Shelley has shown is that promises
that are broken are punished with loss, as Safie’s father loses a daughter (Shelley 102),
and the monster’s revenge deprives Victor of Clerval (148), Elizabeth (166), and his life
(186). Shelley’s portrayals of promises are in keeping with her political view, that “the
integrity of the political community over time…depends on individuals understanding
that they will be held to account –now and for the foreseeable future– for their freely
given pledges to one another” (Bentley 346). Bentley further suggests that Victor’s
decisions to break his promise to the monster and his reluctance to make commitments to

85

family and friends (e.g. delaying his marriage to Elizabeth promised to his mother) are
part of Shelley’s critique of Paine’s “pragmatic approach to creating political
community,” which she does not believe can be accomplished with such a loose concept
of culpability (346).
While Bentley observes that this theme of making and breaking promises in
Frankenstein is clearly not in agreement with Paine or Godwin’s political thought, she
never acknowledges Hobbes, to whom the theory of political contract is forever indebted.
Hobbes recognized that, as covenants are abstractions in the minds of men, they are not
guarantees against men like Paine and Godwin, who see little value in holding them
inviolable (Hobbes 2.17.12). Bentley points out that Victor’s “horror… in perpetuity”
comes from the realization that the monster and his mate could spawn generations of
monsters, for whom he would be responsible based on the contract he forges with the
monster on Mont Blanc (Bentley 345). Paine’s argument that a contract made by men
today cannot be binding for others to follow is therefore the source of Victor’s anxiety
(345). If the monster is capable of procreating, then the agreement Victor makes to
protect mankind from the monster and his mate is only a stopgap measure, because it
would not be binding on their offspring. Rivlin-Beenstock points out that the female
creature herself constitutes the second-generation of her race, and can similarly “refuse to
comply with the Rousseauvian male creature’s rules and violate a patriarchal social
contract made before her birth” (Rivlin-Beenstock 209). Even worse, from a Godwinian
perspective, the monster could just as easily abandon the promise if it no longer served
utility –in whatever way the monster’s diseased mind might rationalize utility. These
political frameworks clearly demonstrate the weaknesses of promises and the anxiety
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they can create for the man with no real hope of enforcing them; but more to the point,
they emphasize the difference between a promise and a contract, which Bentley has
neglected in her analysis. Strictly speaking, a promise is only the oral signification of a
contract shared between two people, that can either be a statement of intention or worded
as a term in what can properly be called a compact or contract (Hobbes 1.14.13) if some
action has already proceeded to show good faith and merit the completion of the promise
in return (1.14.16-17). For example, the monster’s threat, “I shall be with you on your
wedding-night” (Shelley 140), is a promise, merited by an action which precipitated it
(Victor destroying the monster’s mate) (139), but it is not a contract because the action
was in proper terms a “violation of faith” or the failure to uphold one’s side of a contract
(Hobbes 1.14.11). The deal that was struck on Mont Blanc, on the other hand, was a
proper contract. Victor would produce the monster’s desire, and upon delivery of this
promise the monster would be obliged to perform his promise in kind; both parties have a
reciprocal stake and expectation in the proceedings (Shelley 120). This contract,
however, is as far from “community building” as Bentley imagines, and properly an
agreement to withdraw or annihilate the community developing between the creation and
creator (Bentley 326). The fact of the matter is, as far as Shelley believes, that contracts
and willfully keeping pledges are the foundation of political community: these not only
must “be held to account” but they cannot be “freely given” because accountability and
reciprocity are the foundations of social contract, which is properly “community
building” (346). As Hobbes shows in Leviathan, society begins with the notion of a
promise as the foundation of a political system, but it must be expanded. Where a
promise between two men is easily broken, each man can only depend on the other as far
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as he can hold him under his power (which negates the purpose as each man could
potentially resort to force in the first instance) (Hobbes 2.17.1-2). Thus, for promises to
work as a foundation for civilized life, force or the palpable threat of force is a necessity.
To distinguish society from the state of war, men cannot be left to enforce promises
themselves, so they must all agree to lay down that power; however, as force is still a
necessity, some “man, or assembly of men” must retain this power (2.17.13). The
agreement between all the parties who give up their right to enforcing their covenants,
and the understanding that those who retain the power of force for use in “concern [of]
the common peace and safety,” is the expansion of contract into social contract
(2.17.13). In the examples already shown, Shelley seemingly validates the social contract,
and the understanding that force will be brought against men who break covenants in her
novel. The issue of force here creates a complication in the novel, and will be addressed
in a following chapter (1.14.18).
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Chapter Five
Monster/Monarch: Man/Commonwealth
The figure that dominates Hobbes’ introduction to Leviathan is not only a metaphor
for the institution of constitutional monarchy, but is analogous to the physical being of
Frankenstein’s creature. The Leviathan is an imitation of a man “of greater stature and
strength than the natural,” and is a better comparison to Frankenstein’s monster than any
other found in the rhetoric of political science (Hobbes 7). Hobbes’ political theory is as
much indebted to the spirit of scientific enquiry as Shelley’s novel, without becoming
what would be termed “science fiction.” Hobbes’ own fascination with the scientific
discoveries of his day, especially those of William Harvey, who “had demonstrated the
motion of the heart and circulation of the blood… instituting a revolution in medical
science,” and informed the metaphor that equates “the heart and blood” to the “sovereign
and commonwealth” in Hobbes’ introduction (Ross, Schneider and Waldman 62).
Harvey’s work also inspired Hobbes to write his own political ideas in scientific fashion,
working from definitions and first principles towards what he believed were logical
conclusions that would be self-evident. Scientific advances of the day also authorized his
understanding of the senses, which is the foundation of the nature of man and by
extension his political science (Overhoff 25).
There are numerous points of similarity between Hobbes’ introduction in Leviathan
and the plot of Frankenstein. The first several lines themselves correspond to the plot of
Frankenstein, in that man has imitated the works of God and created an “artificial man”
imbued with “an artificial life…giving motion to the whole body” (Hobbes 7). The
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following blazon of body parts and their equivalent offices in Hobbes’ grand metaphor
evokes Shelley’s image of Victor stitching together pieces of various cadavers as he
endeavors to build a giant, taking months to scavenge for materials from various sources
so that he can furnish his creation with desirable “luxuriances” (Shelley 36-37, 39). Even
the metaphoric “matter…and the artificer” of the introduction corresponds to
Frankenstein, as the material from which the “artificial man” is made is (mostly) “Man”
as it has been put together by man (Hobbes 7). Most importantly, the theme that
dominates Hobbes’ introduction is the same that makes up the crux of Shelley’s novel:
the matter of sympathy, whereby Hobbes says we can “read [our]self” in other men and
vice versa (8). The creature’s account of his education in volume two shows this much,
“that wisdom is acquired, not by reading of books” (7). The creature is a very bad reader,
who not only takes all printed word for truth (including fiction) but retains nothing except
that which reaffirms his biases and justifies his self-pity (Turner Sharp 82).Wisdom
cannot come of reading man either (Hobbes 8), as the creature believes he can by
observing the De Laceys (Shelley 91), because he is not already wise enough to read
himself, which is partly a fault of his construction (Hobbes 8). The true nature of
sympathy, Hobbes explains, is to read all of mankind in our selves and by extension
understand them. Hobbes believes this is possible because all men are roughly “equal, in
the faculties of the body, and mind” (1.13.1). If all men are roughly equal, then it is no
great feat to imagine that the motivations and sensations of other men are similar to one’s
own. The creature’s artificial birth, denies him this assumption because he is aware that
he experiences the world so much differently. The creature does not have the benefit
other men naturally have of seeing similarities between themselves and other men. To be
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authentically sympathetic is “harder than to learn any language, or science” (Hobbes 8),
as the creature discovers (Shelley 95). Shelley’s novel demonstrates how a deficit of
sympathy turns a sensitive being into a brute, seemingly to make her readers more
sympathetic to outcasts with good natures, but there is an untapped power in sympathy.
According to Hobbes, once you can read all of men in yourself so that you can feel what
they feel and understand their motivations, you will be more capable of ruling them
(Hobbes 8). The creature himself, as a literal assembly of the bodies of multiple people, is
a perfect symbol of this sympathy, but is incapable of feeling it.
Further, the creature corresponds to Hobbes’ image of an artificially engineered
automaton better than any other philosophers who describe either natural man being
corrupted by society (Rousseau 59) or the “troglodytes…ghosts and goblins” that
succeeded them in light of the French Revolution (Devetak 63). None of these stress
either the manufactured nature of the creature or its singularity, which is the sole
motivation behind its antisocial crimes; after all, even fairies and ghosts live in
communities with their own kind –of which the monster has none (Hobbes 4.47.24-25).
The creature recognizes that his own construction separates him from humanity, both in
constitution and “loathsome” appearance, to the point that he rejects himself as “a blot
upon the earth…whom all men [disown]” (Shelley 96). The creature’s hopes to mitigate
its appearance by means of “gentle demeanor and conciliating words” (91) meet with
failure, as his appearance proves too much of an obstacle, even after he has dedicated
himself to society’s protection and restrains himself from using force against it (110).
This failure leaves the threat or use of violent force as the creature’s only recourse to get
what he wants. Once he recognizes that Victor has made him “more powerful than [his
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maker],” he finally begins to act according to his nature rather than in imitation of
humanity (77); suggesting that, as the world of man around him is already in a state of
civilization, to which he has been denied entry, he remains in the state of war described
by Hobbes (Hobbes 1.14.4). In this state of war the creature, like any man, has the right
to use his own force to provide what he needs for himself, and also “ought to endeavor
peace, as far as he has hope of attaining it” (1.14.4). On Mont Blanc, the monster says
that he will remove himself to the new world once he has what he needs from Victor,
leaving the rest of mankind in peace so long as he is (Shelley 120). His position in the
midst of thriving governments and communities bears similarities to Hobbes’ figure of a
monarch. The monarch is the only person in a constitutional monarchy who has not been
part of the covenant to construct the position, and the source of his own power lies in this
natural right, which all other men have given up to live in peace while the monarch may
still use it freely (Hobbes 2.17.12-13). The creature’s birth, or more properly
construction, is emblematic of the position of the monarch in Hobbes’ theory, although
the presence of constituted governments around the creature complicates the reading, as
does the fact that he is empowered by the act of one man rather than a community of
individuals. As the creature begins with Victor, it is fitting to start there.
As discussed above, Victor exhibits characteristics attributed by Hobbes to Catholic
priests in “The Kingdom of Darkness.” First, Victor’s practices that show him to be part
of the kingdom of darkness are initially displayed in Victor’s juvenile reading which,
steeped in occult imagery (Shelley 24), recalls Hobbes’ “charms compounded of
metaphysics” (Hobbes 4.47.27). Alchemical authors such as Agrippa and Paracelsus
engage in subjects Hobbes considers demonological, or based in “confusion” that is so
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pervasive it not only “mislead[s] citizens into subservience,” but even overpowers the
minds of the demonologists themselves, until “they become incapable of recognizing
anything but their own fantasies” (Martel 109). As Victor begins his studies in earnest,
Shelley depicts him as part of what Hobbes calls “the dark doctrine” (or ghost story) “of
the walking abroad, especially in places consecrated, solitary, or dark, of the ghosts of
men deceased; and thereby to the pretenses of exorcism and conjuration of phantasms”
(Hobbes 4.44.16). Hobbes had already remarked that these “fearful tales” are themselves
the cause of ghosts, when men “believe they see…ghosts walking in churchyards”
because they remember these stories and have overactive imaginations, or else they really
witness “the knavery of such persons, as make use of such superstitious fear, to pass
disguised in the night, to places they would not [want to] be known to haunt” (1.2.7).
Victor collects materials for the creature from “the unhallowed damps of the grave
[and]… charnel houses” this way (Shelley 36). The “supernatural enthusiasm” (33) that
keeps Victor on task and so preoccupied that his “taste for… simple pleasures” is
destroyed and he “neglect[s] the scenes around [him]” (37), is exactly the sort of
demonological occupation that Hobbes describes (Martel 109).
Since Victor’s obsessive search for knowledge becomes his “sole occupation” which
he “exclusively… pursue[s] for its own sake” (Shelley 32), it becomes demonological for
the more literal reason that it violates the law of God. Not only is Victor’s pursuit to
create life in itself a blasphemy that any of Hobbes’ or Shelley’s contemporaries would
recognize but, as far as Victor has allowed natural philosophy to take the place of God
and dedicated all of his hopes and efforts to the dream of “a new species [that will] bless
[him] as its creator and source” (36), he is denying “dependence on the true God” and
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worshipfully pursuing “representations of [his] own fancies” (Hobbes 4.45.10). Doing so
is a violation of the first commandment according to Hobbes, because even though Victor
has not established himself as a god or founded a religion around his creation, he has
nevertheless replaced God with something else that occupies His place (4.45.10).
Furthermore, Victor’s effort “to animate the lifeless clay” and make his dream of “a
new species” a physical reality (Shelley 36) is literally “making up a figure out of the
parts of diverse creatures… [to create]…the resemblance of some phantastical inhabitants
of [his] brain” which is properly an idol (Hobbes 4.45.16). As the construction of the
creature is a performance of Victor’s devotion to his scientific beliefs, the creature is the
object of his worship and his duties towards it include the “months [spent] successfully
collecting and arranging [his] materials[,]…midnight labours” and “profane” acts
(Shelley 36). Victor also sacrifices his own health and vigor to the idol of his science,
which becomes visible as the creature’s body comes together while he becomes “pale
with study, and…emaciated with confinement” (36). This condition plagues him again at
the end of his life. Walton finds him on the arctic ice, “dreadfully emaciated by fatigue
and suffering,” once his obsession turns from creating to following the monster (13). As
it is understood that an idol has no power of its own but only that which men give it
(normally the power they believe it to have and thus allow it), so Victor literally gives up
his vitality to give the creature form and life. He becomes “lifeless” with fatigue and a
“nervous fever” that nearly kills him after its birth (43). Victor’s effort to create a new
being also violates the second commandment God gave the Israelites to “not make to
themselves any image to worship, of their own invention” (Hobbes 4.45.10). As the
creature is a physical embodiment of Victor’s science, which has already been shown to

94

stand in the place of God for him, he has violated divine law and strayed into
demonology as it is commonly understood (Martel 114). What Victor has done is attempt
to make his “[g]od into a finite, portrayable, and knowable being” (114-115).
The being that Victor conceives is, in the strictest sense, what Hobbes would consider
an “idol,” and the thing that supposedly animates it a “phantastical demon,” which is a
term that Hobbes uses synonymously for the idea of the animating principle behind an
idol (Hobbes 4.45.26). It must be pointed out that, in Hobbes’ terms, an “idol” is literally
only in the minds of worshippers, as the demons which men believed to possess physical
bodies were really only their explanation for senses in organs of perception they did not
yet understand, called “spectra” (4.45.8). These could also be termed hallucinations,
optical illusions, or any of the sensations men have that, for lack of a more scientific
designation, are referred to colloquially as “the creeps.” Otherwise, “demon” was the
general name given to a medical or psychiatric illness that men could not account for,
although they believed at the time that it was a physical thing that overtook the body
(4.45.4). Hobbes refutes this belief as a superstition, explaining that although there are
angels and demons in the Bible, no “man’s body was possessed or inhabited by them”
because supernatural entities do have physical bodies, “though subtle and invisible”
(4.45.8); since a “corporeal spirit” cannot occupy the same space as another “body of
flesh and bone… full… of vital and animal spirits,” scriptural accounts of possession
must not be by literal demons or malignant spiritual forces (4.45.5). Victor’s creature, on
the other hand, can properly be conceived as a biblical demon in Hobbes’ terms, as he has
a body and moves swiftly enough to appear “subtle and invisible” (4.45.8): fading into
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the darkness, scaling “nearly perpendicular” cliffs (Shelley 56), “[fleeing] with more than
mortal speed” and (apparently) throwing its voice to seem near, or all around (172).
Just as the creature’s birth is an act of idolatry and mocks the biblical creation story,
the physical creature is a perversion of God’s promise that we will be resurrected with
new bodies, a promise that Hobbes takes literally in Leviathan to mean that we will be
raised again in the flesh “as the angels of God in heaven” whom Hobbes also takes to
have tangible bodies (Hobbes 3.34.23). The creature’s physical form is stronger and
swifter than man’s (Shelley 77), survives on the vegetable matter that man was satisfied
with in the Edenic state (120), and is impervious to environmental conditions (174). All
of these traits make his body preferable to ours and imitate the bodies promised to us
when God raises our bodies again (Hobbes 4.44.15); but the creature’s hideousness is a
mockery of his power. The creature is superior to us in almost every way, but for all of
Victor’s intentions it is more ugly (Shelley 39), and shows that Victor’s creation is only a
forgery of the imitation of God, and a flawed human rendering at that. The failed
impersonation of humanity makes his physical appearance even more monstrous and
demonic. The fact that the creature is built from human parts also points to Hobbes’
illustration of the body politic being a collection of people’s individual wills, submitted to
the authority of a single unifying authority, as explained already in chapter two.
Even though Victor explicitly calls his creature a “daemon” or “devil” (56), the fact
that he uses these terms before the creature commits a crime either reduces the
significance of the label to a prejudice based on appearance or shows that he is
apprehensive that his work is inherently transgressive. Victor first uses the terms
“creature” (38), “wretch,” and “being” (39) to describe his creation, which are all
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sympathetic terms shared by characters like Victor and Justine. Once he uses the term
“demonological corpse” (40), the creature is notably distanced from other characters, and
from that point is almost exclusively referred to by the appellations of “monster” (twenty
eight times), “demon” or “devil” (thirty-one times). “Monster” literally refers to a
“creature which is part animal and part human... large, ugly, and frightening” or to the
root word “monēre” which means “to warn” (OED). Thus, the term serves as both a
physical descriptor and an appropriate expression of Shelley’s use of the creature as a
literal warning to her readers not to follow in Victor’s footsteps (Baldick 10). The terms
“demon” or “devil” share the same negative connotation as they represent the main
antagonists to humanity in the Bible, rather than the more vague term “monster.” Victor
is never referred to in these religiously significant terms, even though he is framed as the
creature’s double in the novel. The use of these religious monikers thus alienates the
creature from other characters in the novel in a textual sense. The division between terms
accentuates the dichotomy between Victor as a godlike creator figure and the creature as
his opposite, but it is not until the creature admits to murdering William that he can justly
be called a monster (117), nor until he declares his enmity against all humankind (79) that
the name demon is accurate. Hobbes reasons that demons are either evil angels (Hobbes
3.34.23-24) or the physical enemies of God’s people on Earth, who are “the Enemy, the
Accuser, and Destroyer” (3.38.12-13). Hobbes’ classifications of demons would also
include Victor as far as he represents the Roman church and creates the monster.
Interestingly, the creature is well-equipped to be both the “Enemy” and “Destroyer” by
merit of its form, which inspires enmity in man and has abundant strength, but his role as
“Accuser” is one that he only begins with the potential to fulfil, and deliberately chooses
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to become by framing Justine for William’s murder (Shelley 118). This distinction
provides context for a scene which otherwise makes little sense. The motive given for
framing Justine is that he will never have the affections of a beautiful woman, which is
poor motivation given that he is already aware he can take things by force and that she is
not “so beautiful as she whose portrait [he] held” (118). If his motivation is jealous rage,
the crimes of passion he might commit include rape or murder, but framing someone is a
calculated offense; it serves to either injure a specific party (which Justine is not, because
he is unaware of her connection to the house of Frankenstein), or draws attention away
from the real criminal. As the creature has not revealed himself in Geneva, framing
Justine is superfluous. The monster could just walk away and keep the miniature, which
has more draw for him in his lonely condition than it provides motive for Justine, who
would only have had to ask Elizabeth for it (64). The monster committing his act of
“mischief” chiefly for the pleasure of undermining the “sanguinary laws of man” makes
more sense than framing a random woman for a murder he would never be charged with
(118). His actions cement his role as accuser.
The most important factor that casts the creature as demonic is his self-identification
with Lucifer in Paradise Lost which, as noted in chapter two, illustrates his choice
between the paradigm of human rights imagined by Paine, or Hobbes’ commonwealth.
Had he identified with Adam he would have aligned himself with Paine’s belief that God
made Adam in his own image, complete with a conscience that protects the inalienable
human rights of others (Fruchtman 24). In Paine’s view, these rights are universal by
virtue of being born human, as the rights were passed along to each generation to govern
themselves and make their own choices as Adam had initially. Adam had a creator, but
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otherwise he and Eve were without society and ruled by conscience, not by government
or civil law (Shelley 105). This is representative of the model of republicanism that Paine
and Godwin believed was best-suited to men. The creature is alienated from human rights
by his unnatural creation, and seeing that he is unlike human beings, he selects Lucifer as
his role-model instead. Lucifer was one of many angels but he was esteemed beyond
them, which corresponds to a king among men or a constitutional monarchy with God at
the head. By choosing Lucifer over Adam, the monster makes an argument that he should
not be alone, because at least “Satan had his companions… to admire and encourage
him” (105). Lucifer also represents the ambition to rebel against authority (or power) and
take by force what one feels entitled to. This ambition is seen plainly when the monster
seeks Frankenstein out and threatens him to get what he wants. This encounter confirms
Hobbes’ view of the state of nature, where every man takes what they need by force
(Hobbes 1.13.3). The creature naturally exhibited self-serving behaviour when he claimed
a shepherd’s hut and food (Shelley 83). The declaration he makes later that the place was
as “divine a retreat as Pandaemonium appeared to the daemons of hell” (83) ties his act of
procurement to his choice of Lucifer as a role-model. He also continues to knowingly
pilfer from the De Laceys for “[a] considerable period” before he discovers he can feed
himself from the woods more easily than they can support him and themselves (which
would lead to his discovery and rejection) (88).
The creature’s imitation of the De Lacey family in volume two must be distinguished
as the imitation of mankind’s virtues. The creature already understands by this point that
he can use force or terror to take what he wants from a single man, but he has also
experienced the terror and confusion of confronting a community of men at once, and
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knows the difference between his own strength and that of a group (83). The equality of
men’s power over one another is pointed out in Leviathan, where Hobbes says that “as to
the strength of body, the weakest has strength enough to kill the strongest, either by secret
machination, or by confederacy with others, that are in the same danger as himself”
(Hobbes 1.13.1). The creature recognizes that although he can overpower one or several
men quite easily, he cannot hope to grapple successfully with the whole world. His
strength, stature, and appearance become detrimental to him because he appears as the
danger that other men must protect themselves from by banding together (1.13.1). The
creature decides to abandon the use of his strength at this time, and resorts to imitating
man so that he can gain compatriots instead. The creature’s resolve to learn language is
what Hobbes describes as a “secret machination” (1.13.1). Shelley’s aggressive word
choices present the creature’s frame of mind as one centered on conquest (1.13.1). The
creature invades part of the De Lacey home to observe the cottagers surreptitiously, and
resolves not to reveal himself until he “become[s a] master of their language” because he
thinks that will help “make them overlook the deformity of [his] figure” (Shelley 90). The
language used here is only a rendering of the impressionistic intent of his mind before he
actually had terms to describe it, but his intent is characterized by force even if his
methods are more subtle. Note that the creature does not say he will wait until he can
speak to them persuasively or express his feelings and intentions, he says he will wait
until he can “make them overlook the deformity” [my emphasis] (90). The creature’s
understanding of language at this point is as “a godlike science,” as though the right
combination of words will “[produce] pleasure or pain…in the minds and countenances
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of the hearers” consistently (88). The creature’s desire to “master… their language”
shows that he intends to weaponize this science, and use it on the De Laceys (90).
Aside from language, the creature imitates other things the De Laceys do, including
using tools and chopping wood (88). This benefits the creature directly: since he can
provide more firewood in a night than Felix can in “several days,” they can make their
fire hotter (88), thus improving the creature’s living conditions by heating his hovel
through the bordering wall of the cottage (84). Beyond this improvement, the creature
recognizes that every time he does a chore unbidden and unobserved, the De Laceys take
his favours for the work of a “good spirit” and are happy for it (91). As he sees the De
Laceys as “superior beings” and “the arbiters of [his] future destiny” these actions are
fitting –first because they preserve the family until spring, and he cannot rest his future
hopes in dead protectors; second, because it is right to pay homage to a protector, and the
creature can observe by now that human beings give payment in exchange for goods,
services and board; third, because he intends to reveal himself to them once he has the
right words, and being able to reveal himself as the “good spirit” is a persuasive proof
that they can trust him and that he deserves their help (91). Imitating humanity ultimately
fails for the creature because he is so vastly different from human beings. The last
attempt he makes to earn humanity’s favour is in volume two when he rescues a young
woman from drowning (115). The girl is unconscious when he drags her out of the water
and the man who follows after her assumes the worst, shooting the creature when he
expects gratitude (115). The creature finally resolves that no matter what he does, men
will never accept him. At this point, all “feelings of kindness and gentleness… [give]
place to hellish rage,” so the creature finally “vow[s] eternal hatred and vengeance to all
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mankind,” recognizing that he is destined to be set in opposition to the entire species of
man (116).
The creature’s physiognomy always excludes him from the community of man, not
because the creature is inherently evil (as Shelley shows at length), or for lack of trying to
ingratiate himself to man, as he is shown to be very industrious in applying himself to the
subjects and activities he thinks will garner affection. The fact that the creature cannot
win the love of humanity stems from his very creation. Victor already reads as the
archetypal representation of the Roman Catholic priesthood, and therefore his actions –
including the construction of the creature– have to be read in light of a Hobbesian
suspicion that they are intended to deceive or destabilize communities.
Starting from the assumption that Victor’s actions are not as magnanimous as he
claims in the initial stages of the creation process, the difference between renewing life
and creating life has to be discerned. Victor claims that in time he could “renew life
where death had… devoted the body to corruption” (36) and implies that the goal of his
experiment was to restore life to those who are dead or dying, as it was his childhood
dream to discover “the elixir of life… banish disease from the human frame, and render
man invulnerable to any but a violent death” (23). The applications of this experiment,
although alchemical and superstitious in its foundations, would ultimately be medical,
and similar to the intentions of Dr. John Hunter in his “Proposals for the Recovery of
People apparently drowned” (1776). Victor differs from Hunter in the respect that his
science is anti-social, because Hunter, unlike Victor, “shewed [his observations and
experiments] to a Society of which [he was] a member” (Hunter 412) for the express
interest of promulgating scientific understanding to be improved upon and employed for
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the betterment of humanity (413). Hunter’s experiment was also only intended to restore
“the action of life suspended for a time” (413) unlike other scientists whose attempts to
“revive” dead bodies were similar to Victor’s hopes of creating life (Oakes 63). The act
of restoring life is medical, and beneficial to mankind, but Victor’s project of playing
with the “ideal bounds” of life is an act of creation; it does not preserve a human life, but
creates a new being whose continued absence would have made no difference to
humanity (Shelley 36). Furthermore, Victor’s hopes of creating “[a] new species” of
“many happy and excellent natures” is an admission that he is less interested in ever
discovering the power to “renew life” than in creating an abundance of new ones (36).
The secluded and surreptitious act of building the creature is in itself anti-social
(which begs the question whether the circumstances of the creature’s birth do not shape
its personality), but Victor’s fantasy that it will be part of a much larger project takes on
the nature of an anti-social design in a Hobbesian reading. Victor’s hope that “a new
species would bless [him] as their creator and source… [and that] no father could claim
the gratitude of his child so completely as [he] should deserve theirs” assumes that their
allegiance to him would supersede the authority of the kings in the countries of their
origin, making him the undisputable ruler of a race of non-human beings (36). Victor’s
calls his antisocial behaviour at this time his “old habits,” which included keeping secrets
from his family and friends, self-confinement, violating taboos, living in filth, and
behaving as a nocturnal creature, depriving him of “all soul or sensation” and
dehumanizing him, making him more fit for the company of the subspecies he works to
create than man (36). As discussed above, the creature shares traits with demons, and
Victor’s role in the kingdom of darkness is the image of the Catholic priesthood; thus, the
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command of a generation of giants places Victor in the place of “King Oberon…
Beelzebub… [or] the Pope” (Hobbes 4.47.23). The artificial creatures Victor imagines
resemble a perverted resurrection, and what Hobbes calls the greatest “abuse of
scripture,” to assert “that the kingdom of God…is the present Church, or multitude of
Christian men now living, or that being dead, are to rise again on the last day,” as
opposed to the theocratic state of the Jews in the time before Saul (4.44.4). The reality of
Frankenstein’s vision is the creation of a stateless nation like the Romani or the Jewish
people before 1948, and history has made it abundantly clear that these peoples suffer at
the hands of others. The result of Victor’s scheme would be anything but “a torrent of
light” unless he believes that they will be the willing slaves of a utopian society (Shelley
36). Either way, Victor’s use of “dark doctrines” to create a nation under him would
literally be “setting up an unlawful power over the lawful sovereigns of Christian people”
(Hobbes 4.47.17), and the intent behind Victor’s creation results in a being that men
should naturally fear and despise. If Victor had not abandoned the project and had
continued to create beings after his original inclination, then the resulting clash with
humanity would eventually have been devastating. The question that arises, from a
Hobbesian perspective, is why does Victor stop? And why does the result of his
experiment turn out so disastrously?
According to a Hobbesian reading, Victor’s creation is the first step in constructing a
state to stand in opposition to Christian commonwealths or, even if this is not his
intention, he begins to design an under-class that will inevitably come into conflict with
man. The first creature he creates is itself the image of the commonwealth in small: he is
an artificially created imitation of man, created by man, made of parts of men that
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represent the multitude of persons who make up the commonwealth (7). He is also
stronger than natural man and of “greater stature” (7) that, combined with his appearance,
also makes him a parody of Saul, the first king of the Jews, who “from his shoulders and
upward… was higher than any of the people” and better looking than anyone else in the
nation (1 Samuel 9:2). And just as God’s people were warned that their King would put
them in peril (1 Samuel 8:11-18), the creature brings misery down on the head of his
creator (Shelley 77). The creature is an overwhelming specimen in both its strength and
its hideousness, and upon the completion of Victor’s project, Victor says “the beauty of
the dream vanished” and he could no longer stand to be near it (39). If the creature stands
for the allegory of the state and Victor stands for a force that is trying to wrest power
from the state to himself by setting up an unnatural state beneath him, then his disgust
could arise from the sudden realization that what he has created is actually beyond his
control. From this perspective, Victor has been counting on the “new species… bless[ing
him] as its creator and source” and imagining that they will serve him more faithfully
than a father could expect of his children (36). On an allegorical level, Victor attempts to
build a state where he would be a king but, instead of building subjects, he over-reached
and figured Leviathan on his first attempt: a nearly perfect embodiment of the
commonwealth, more powerful than any man, including himself. Victor’s fear must have
been similar to the realization of some men when they first instituted the commonwealth,
and realized that just as Victor “deprive[s] [himself] of health and rest” (39) they had
given up their individual rights to the monarch, who has the same potential as the monster
to be despotic or benevolent (Hobbes 2.17.13). Faced with a being of undeniable power,
and weakened by his role in creating it, Victor recognizes his place in the allegory of
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constructing the state as one of the men who put down their right to self-rule, and realizes
his hope of being the ruler of many creatures is exploded by the reality that the balance of
power is grossly against his interests.
According to Hobbes’ views on parental authority, Victor’s claim to the gratitude of
the beings, which is properly called the “right of dominion by generation…which the
parent hath over his [or her] children,” is made less complicated because there is no
mother, whom Victor would have to contend or contract with for this right (2.20.4).
Hobbes declares that children can only completely obey one authority (2.20.4). This
dominion “is not derived from the generation [of children]… but from the child’s
consent, either express, or by other sufficient arguments declared” (2.20.4). Victor is not
guaranteed the right to be in charge; the creature which he has created is “more powerful
than [Victor]” (Shelley 77) and could choose to acquire dominion over Victor in the other
way, by conquest (Hobbes 2.20.4). Victor has created a being (which may very well be
immortal) and denied himself of the power whereby a man has “natural force” over his
child by “being able to destroy them if they refuse [his governance]” (2.17.15). Victor
abandons the creature because he suddenly fears its potential to overtake him, and flees
for his life in fear it might “detain” him (Shelley 40). Ironically, as parental authority is
invested “in him that nourisheth [the child]... [because] every man is supposed to promise
obedience, to him, in whose power it is to save, or destroy him” (Hobbes 2.20.5), Victor
deprives himself of the power that he had very nearly acquired. If Victor had gambled on
the creature observing the debt it had to him, the creature might indeed have submitted;
but as Victor does not guarantee its “peace and…defense” and leaves the creature to his

106

own devices (2.17.13), then it is not properly “[his] creature” and he is not really the
creature’s “natural lord and king” (Shelley 77).
Because Victor does not rear him as a subject, the creature eventually realizes his own
potential as the figuration of a constitutional monarchy, and although he treats Victor
with feigned reverence and says “I will not be tempted to set myself in opposition to
thee” (77), he is in fact only performing the same plan he had already tried with the De
Laceys –showing a “gentle demeanour and conciliating words.. [to] win [Frankenstein’s]
favour” (91). In reality, the creature already recognizes, that by the strength of his
(un)natural endowments (77), he is already the “master” and Victor is his “Slave” (140).
He must perpetuate his ruse, if he is to convince Victor to build his mate (118), because
he still seeks to fulfill the purpose Frankenstein gave him as part of a larger project. The
creature was envisioned as one of “many happy and excellent natures” in the design
phase, but as Victor abandoned it and precluded the creature’s gratitude, he also left it as
one component part of a larger design (36). Just as the state does not function properly
without all of its component offices (Hobbes 7), the creature feels incomplete by itself
and has a need for community that he requires Frankenstein to fill; this is the “duty” that
he requires of Victor (Shelley 77). While the creature might impulsively want to kill
Victor, he has an equal compulsion not to, because his need for community can only be
fulfilled if Victor creates other monsters (118). Community with Victor can also be
guaranteed as long as he is in pursuit, which is why the creature continues to taunt Victor
on their journey north, leaving food and directions to follow (174).
When Victor does eventually die, the creature resolves to die with him, because his
creator can no longer fulfil his need for community in either sense (190). The creature
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reports that he initially wished to be appreciated by “beings” who would ignore his
appearance and “love [him] for [his] excellent qualities” (189). The similarity of this to
Frankenstein’s vision of a “new species… [with] many happy and excellent natures” (36)
reinforces that the creature is, from the beginning, trying to achieve the set of
expectations that Victor had for him. Although he claims that the hatefulness of his vices
moves him to self-destruction, this assertion does not ‘ring true’; his repeated observation
that even Lucifer had “friends and associates in his desolation” suggests that, given a
community of beings as evil as himself, he would continue living (189). The true
motivation for his suicide is that, with Victor dead, he can no longer satisfy his need for
community, and no amount of torture or murder will “consummate the series of [his]
being” (190), a phrase with a double meaning: either suicide is the final crime that can
provide him satisfaction, or literally, if he is understood to be one component of Victor’s
full project, there is no longer any hope of Victor being persuaded to build the
complementing pieces.
The creature’s need for community shows how like Leviathan he is, as he also
depends on others for purpose. The creature’s rapid development, as related in his tale to
Victor charts his greater need for stimulation and humanity as time progresses. At first he
barely understands or perceives time beyond sense impressions when he is alone (80),
then, with his first discovery of humanity’s existence (no more than a smoldering
campfire and some food), he is provoked into problem-solving and basic causal reasoning
(81). The first encounters with humanity have less impact on the creature than his interest
in their useful material possessions, including food, shelter (83), and artificial light (86).
His first lasting bond to humanity, the De Laceys, marks an exponential rate of
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development; by observing them, his thoughts grow more complex, he begins to
understand the basis of emotional comprehension beyond the pleasures or pains of the
senses, and he begins to think reflectively (87). The more time he spends with them, the
more they strengthen him, firstly by unknowingly providing his shelter (84), then food
(88), then the basics of language (89). Eventually the average day in his life goes from
spying on the De Laceys and doing simple chores (91) to learning to speak and read (95)
and ingesting such advanced literature as “Paradise Lost…Plutarch’s Lives, and the
Sorrows of Werter” (103). Throughout the course of his development his limited
connection to humanity advances him in ways he does not know. He also grows more
dependent on it, until he eventually grows bold enough to try to kidnap and raise William
to be his “companion and friend” (117). Even the limited contact the creature has with
society strengthens him manifestly, but the strength he gains also becomes a burden. As
the creature can neither abide with mankind nor retreat into exile without companionship
(120), he has become dependent on community for his strength, and feels a growing need
to be acknowledged and sympathized with (120). The creature has already advanced as
far as he can in solitude, where he has given birth to “vices,” and he feels that by having
“communion with… a sensitive being” he will advance in the realm of virtue, “and
become linked to the chain of existence and events” (121). The creature requires
community for identity, and thinks it will provide what he lacks.
Similar to the creature, Leviathan’s identity is dependent on those that give it form.
The “sovereignty… magistrates…officers…[and] counsellors” are the component parts
that give it shape and, without community, Leviathan would be more malformed than the
creature, by excising organs or amputating limbs (Hobbes 7). Just as the creature would
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have withered and starved without stealing from humanity at first (Shelley 88), Leviathan
would become enfeebled without the “wealth and riches of all the particular members”
(Hobbes 7). The creature’s need for validation is also necessary for Leviathan, since it is
created by compact for the purpose of the “peace and common defence” (2.17.13). The
monarch (who is indivisible from the Leviathan as the soul is from the body) is
responsible for keeping peace among all members of the social contract by being “a
common power, to keep them in awe” (2.27.12). The monarch retains his rights while
others voluntarily give up theirs for the mutual defense of all parties involved in the
compact that forms the commonwealth (2.17.13).
While Frankenstein’s creature may want to kill Victor, he will not because this would
release him from the monster’s power. In Hobbesian terms, Victor is the only “subject”
the creature has, and he “cannot without [the creature’s] leave cast off the monarchy”
(2.18.3-4); the tie that binds them is “only dissoluble by the annihilation of one of
[them]” (Shelley 77). The monster has become the monarch, but whatever power he has
comes from Victor’s original act of creating him (140). As Richard Devetak describes it,
the creature is self-aware of the fact that his role is dependent on Victor’s continued
existence, “that their relationship is dialectical and interdependent” (Devetak 625). By
giving the creature life and making it stronger than he can possibly hope to destroy or
control, Victor has given up his power to one that is set over himself, and has no recourse
to withdraw it (77); as the creature is his invention and Victor is responsible for the
damage it causes, so the men who institute the commonwealth are said to be the “author
of whatsoever he that so beareth their person, shall act, or cause to be acted” (Hobbes
2.17.13-14). The complicated relationship between a representative agent and the
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represented body has become truer of the Frankenstein mythology than in the novel itself,
as few in the novel are ever alerted to Victor’s guilt, but outside of the text in the popular
media the monster itself has become infamous by the name “Frankenstein.”
Victor can neither free himself from the monster that pursues him (Shelley 57) nor
ignore his role in its crimes, which he claims responsibility for after Clerval’s death
(148). On both the narrative level and in the Hobbesian analogy, the creature is similarly
bound to Victor. Like the Leviathan, Victor’s creature did not ask to be brought into
being (110). The Leviathan (or more properly the sovereign) is left out of the contract
that institutes him, because the social contract is not an agreement that he makes with the
subject that empowers him, but the agreements between other subjects authorize his
power (Hobbes 2.17.13). In Hobbes’ opinion, the nature of these agreements means that
the sovereign, not having a part in his own installment, has no right to forfeit his power
(2.18.4). Likewise, the creature will not give up his power over Victor, who is his
strongest connection to the world, and his last best hope for community (Shelley 114),
nor will he extinguish his own life while this hope persists on some level (77). Thus
neither Victor nor the creature can abandon their association with each other, nor can
Victor accuse the creature of any crime without acknowledging that he is equally guilty
for having given the creature power to perpetrate the acts, as those that have instituted the
Leviathan have given the monarch the right to act on their behalf (Hobbes 2.18.6). By
extension, according to Hobbesian social contract theory, there is no way for Victor to
justly condemn the creature’s actions, because any action that the monarch takes is done
under the authority that the subject gave up to him, so the subject would be punishing the
monarch for the action taken on his own behalf (2.18.6). For this reason, Victor can also
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not justly kill the monster because it would be “punish[ing] another, for the actions
committed by himself” namely, creating the creature (2.18.7). It is this clause in Hobbes’
social contract theory that gives force to the creature’s charge, that Victor “sport[s]…
with life” (Shelley 77).
The creature, on the other hand, may rightfully take any action against Victor, as the
sovereign has all “power…of punishing with corporal, or pecuniary punishment” because
of Victor’s role in its creation –not in spite of it (Hobbes 2.18.14). The monarch’s power
rests in his capability to lawfully use his natural right to all things (1.14.4) and the
agreement of all others to lay down theirs (1.14.6). The creature’s rights to exact
punishment against Victor appear limitless, because “if there be no law made” to restrain
Victor’s behaviour, he may assign the punishment that will most effectively “deter”
Victor from acting against his interests (2.18.14), including Victor’s destruction of the
monster’s bride (Shelley 139). Any punishment that the monster decides will force Victor
to consent to his will is therefore lawful, such as murdering Clerval (148). Destroying the
bride in this case is a “violation of faith” where payment for services or goods rendered is
deliberately retracted (Hobbes 1.14.11), as the creature promised to “leave [mankind] and
[Victor] at peace” in return for Victor’s consent to build another creature (Shelley 77).
The monster also attaches a punishment to this compact if Victor refuses, to “glut the
maw of death… with the blood of [Victor’s] remaining friends” (77). The creature’s
action in this instance is therefore justified, as Clerval’s death is not a murder, but an act
of punishment for Victor (148), done by Victor’s own authority (Hobbes 2.18.6) in
response to the breaking of his promise (Shelley 139), as per previously exchanged oaths
where consent was freely given (122). The murder of Elizabeth (165) is a further reprisal
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for the destruction of the monster’s mate (139), which cannot be held against him either,
as the monster has not laid down his natural rights (Hobbes 2.17.13). Thus he still retains
his right in the state of nature to all things, and “nothing can be unjust” (1.13.13).
The death of Clerval is truly the most hazardous for Victor in the narrative frame, as
he is put in mortal peril at the hands of the novel’s third civilian court (Shelley 146-147).
But it is also the most telling with regard to his place in the Hobbesian reading. Again,
Victor’s alignment with the Roman Catholic priesthood is significant here, as Victor has
travelled to a foreign country and been charged for a specific and heinous crime (145).
Normal circumstances in the novel, as shown by the trial of Justine Moritz (65) and the
Turkish merchant (98), represent the civic justice system to be upsettingly prone to
passing unjust sentences on victims of circumstance. In the case of Justine, she was found
guilty because the “circumstantial evidence” (65) and the “fear, and hatred of the crime”
she was charged with was enough to attach an insurmountable stigma of guilt to her in
the minds of the jury (63). The Turkish merchant’s sentence is passed on him, not
because of the crime he is supposed to have committed, but because he is foreign and the
courts had reason to be prejudiced against him (98). Victor should by all means face a
much greater challenge in Ireland, as he is a foreigner, charged with murder as Justine
was, and has eyewitnesses (as unreliable as they are) that corroborate each other’s
statements (146-147). Whereas both of the former cases attracted a death sentence, Victor
is not even required to stand at his trial, and every effort is made to prove his innocence
(153). The matter that assures his safekeeping, is that the magistrate sends word to his
father, who makes haste to help extract him from his circumstances (151-152).
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As Victor represents the priesthood, his felicitous release from captivity is not
surprising; Hobbes openly complains that all “bishops,… priests… monks, and friars”
can travel abroad, enjoy the security of the state as it is maintained by the sovereign of
that land, yet disrespect him and show disregard for the laws of the state (Hobbes 4.47.67). These religious figures are exempted from persecution under the law the way that
some diplomats enjoy immunity abroad today (as well as exempt from paying into the
public system of taxation) because they are under the protection of the papacy (4.47.6-7).
This is a destabilizing influence in the state, as it shows the civil authority to be
submissive to a foreign power that protects its own subjects from being tried for criminal
actions (4.47.7). The acknowledgement of Victor’s father being able to clear Victor
(Shelley 151), despite the body of evidence against him (146-147), can be interpreted as a
sign of the power of the Pope, who shelters his children while they are abroad (Hobbes
4.47.7), and so they “vanish away from the tribunals of civil justice” (4.47.26). In
Hobbes’ time at least, the papacy maintained this power shrewdly in its political dealings
with other countries, as sovereigns were bullied by the papacy, which would refuse to
perform the ceremony that granted a monarch legitimacy in the eyes of his subjects, or
else authorized the subjects to disobey their monarch if he did not bend to the Pope’s
authority (4.44.6).
The creature also enjoys immunity from his position as the representative of the
commonwealth. He has the right to create laws as he pleases, or amend and repeal them
as he so chooses and as often as it is convenient to him (2.26.5-6). The sovereign also
cannot be justly tried or charged by his subjects (2.18.7); between these powers, Hobbes
acknowledges that the monarch (and therefore the creature) is “not subject” to any laws
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which are of his commonwealth, or any other commonwealth which does not first
conquer his, because otherwise he would have to set another judge over himself, which
would open his subjects to civil war or to being conquered by a foreign power (2.29.9).
This place the creature occupies outside the laws of man is demonstrated by the
interactions between Victor and the Genevan magistrate he tries to enlist in helping him
destroy the monster in volume three. The encounter begins with Victor making an official
statement condemning the creature’s crimes (Shelley 168). However, once Victor goes
into the details of his account, the monster, and the region he is supposed to inhabit
amount to the simple truth that whether the magistrate believes his tale is delirium or not,
it would be “impracticable” to pursue the monster because the creature is unnaturally
stronger and swifter than his officers, in a literal state of nature they cannot pursue (169170). Although the magistrate offers to pursue the monster as far as he is able, the
monster’s existence is such that it cannot be put on trial, because there is no power that
can hold him to a prison or courtroom (170). So Victor decides that if there is no legal
recourse, then he will seek revenge instead of justice (170).
Within the Hobbesian paradigm, the only recourse that Victor has to wrest himself
from the creature’s authority is if the creature can no longer serve the primary function of
the state: to provide its subjects with protection (Hobbes 2.21.21). The failure of the
monarch to provide protection is the only circumstance under which Hobbes believes a
subject may rightfully shirk the authority of the state and reassert themselves as their own
defenders (2.21.21). Victor therefore has no right to rebel because, as I have shown,
causing Victor pain falls under the purview of punishment, as does any force that passes
down from the state to the subject, and no one else threatens Victor (outside of the civil
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courts of Ireland, which is also punishment) (Shelley 147). Thus, without a threat which
is set in motion by the monster directly or indirectly, he has no justifiable recourse in the
Hobbesian paradigm. In fact, the creature never directly attacks Victor in the course of
the novel, so he never comes under direct threat from the figure of the commonwealth
itself. Even when he is leading Victor into the perils of the arctic, he provides Victor with
nourishment to preserve his life (174).
The lack of legitimate recourse to break Victor’s compact causes him to take action
that is very appropriate for his place in the Hobbesian reading. Victor invokes the “spirits
of the dead” and “wandering ministers of vengeance” after the fashion of a priest of the
kingdom of darkness (172). He then makes a pilgrimage of his revenge and lives in a
remarkably similar way to the creature in solitude and misery (133). Victor’s ultimate
failure speaks to Hobbes’ dislike for the Catholic Church and all inhabitants of the
kingdom of darkness, as his address to incorporeal demonic spirits rather than God leads
to his destruction, but it also works on the material level. As both Shelley and Hobbes are
Christians with conservative principles who have nevertheless written remarkably “atheistic” texts that develop their own “metaphysics, psychology…and …politics in which
the idea of God [plays] no functional role” (Ross, Schneider and Waldman 124), one of
the most poignant images in the novel stresses its materialism. When Victor wanders the
northern deserts and finds “a repast…prepared for [him] in the desert,” he credits a “spirit
of good [that] followed and directed [his] steps” (Shelley 173). He takes this as a gift
from those forces he called on at the onset of his quest (172), but Shelley is very
explicitly pointing to the reality that Victor’s “good spirit” (91) is just the creature
prolonging his torment, for which he must keep Victor alive (174). In the Hobbesian
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reading, the sardonic criticism is palpably read-in: even the state that is slowly killing you
has more interest in preserving your life than all of the occult forces you pray to.
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Chapter Six
On a Dreary Night in November…
Although there is no current scholarship that draws a direct comparison between
Thomas Hobbes’ social contract theory and Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein, this thesis has
made a strong case to expand on Hobbes’ theory to fill this void. As I have shown, the
efforts of Hobbes’ contemporaries to relegate him to an embarrassing chapter in Britain’s
history only succeeded until individuals more than a century later realized how far he was
ahead of his time. Hobbes’ description of an a-moral, a-theistic, absolute ruler of artificial
construction is the ideal figure to examine in the context of Frankenstein’s monster,
particularly as far as the story’s revolutionary inspirations draw on questions of rule
(Hobbes 7). The parallels between the French Revolution and the English Civil war –or
more generally any civil conflict– are present in Shelley’s work, and this thesis
contributes to the long tradition of demonstrating Frankenstein’s political flexibility and
continuing relevance.
This thesis is the first to look at Frankenstein’s place in a lineage of political thought
reaching back to the seventeenth century and to apply Hobbesian theory directly to the
novel. A survey of political thought from Thomas Hobbes through Edmund Burke,
Thomas Paine, Mary Wollstonecraft, William Godwin, and Mary Shelley hereby
provides evidence of an affinity between Hobbes’ and Shelley’s political thinking,
especially on the subject of social contract theory.
Frankenstein’s creature responds to contemporary political paradigms, as read
alternatively as a monstrous representation of the aristocracy, or as a representative of
revolutionary violence. While the creature is made to stand both for and against
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revolutionary democratization, the more interesting and compelling evidence points
towards the creature as a representative of monarchic forces. A close examination of his
physical construction, power, animalism, entitlement to those things he feels he deserves
from his creator, and attitude towards other characters and their property confirms that, in
a Hobbesian reading, the monster is made in the image of an absolute monarch. The fact
that the monster occupies the role of the monarch in both the rhetoric of the English Civil
War and the French Revolution points to an inherited rhetoric from Hobbes’ time, a
rhetoric that was used to roughly the same effect more than a century later.
Revolutionary history is also evoked in the settings of the novel. While Randel has
noted the significance of real locations such as Geneva and Ingolstadt to Frankenstein
and the revolutionary-era conflicts that they memorialize, this thesis focusses specifically
on contemporary anxieties regarding liberal education and continental influences. Late
eighteenth and early nineteenth century fears of radical philosophy proliferating in Britain
are compared to the concerns of Hobbes’ contemporaries over the influences of the
Roman Catholic and Presbyterian churches. Aside from pointing to different expressions
of British xenophobia, this comparison demonstrates that the place Victor occupies in
Revolutionary-era paranoia has a corresponding incarnation in the English Civil War era.
There is also a great deal of evidence for a Hobbesian reading to support Victor’s place as
a representative of the Roman Catholic priesthood, which establishes his antagonistic
position in relation to the creature as a result of his symbolic role as the Hobbesian
Leviathan. Victor’s education in Ingolstadt and Geneva is accordingly reviewed both in
the terms of Burke’s allegations against faithless revolutionary intellectuals and against
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the original use of the images Burke has adopted that were levelled against
supernaturalism.
The fourth part of this study demonstrates that the family unit in Frankenstein is a
troubled miniature show of the influences of revolutionary angst on the domestic sphere,
and explores the father-child relationships in the novel. The most significant finding is
that the most important father-child relationships resist patriarchal influences and portray
children pushing boundaries into brave new frontiers. This insight into parent-child
relationships in the novel is evocative of the larger political atmosphere of Shelley’s time
as America, France, and parts of Europe moved towards democratization. Shelley also
demonstrates a level of tension in her writing as her novel becomes a forum for
expressing her personal contention with her father’s moral and political philosophy,
especially Godwin’s comments on the nature of society, promises, sympathy, necessity
and utilitarianism. An examination of changes between the 1818 and 1831 editions show
furthermore that Shelley’s opinions evolved and became more conservative, particularly
as she censored passages that clearly exhibited the influences of her inner circle, and
rewrote them according to more conservative and religious traditions. Godwinian
necessity, materialism, and utilitarianism are called into question and contrasted with
Hobbesian theory to show that Shelley’s attitudes towards social order coincide more
with Hobbes’ portrayal of the social contract than Godwinian expectations of individuals
arranging themselves in loose but responsible societies sustained by utilitarianism.
Finally, the conflict between Victor and his creature is re-envisioned in strictly
Hobbesian terms as a struggle for political power in a world that operates under the
assumptions of social contract theory laid out in Leviathan. The creature is read as the
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Hobbesian Leviathan based on the artificial birth, power, and unnatural gifts that allow it
to behave in ways that Hobbes would only deem appropriate for one in the condition of
nature. By contrast Victor, who is born into the social contract, is guilty of trying to
introduce a new race of beings under his control that would have elevated him to the
status of a demigod. Victor is therefore shown to represent the dark threat of the Roman
Catholic priesthood and revealed to be the novel’s natural antagonist, which in turn sets
the creature as the would-be protagonist. The sympathy garnered for the creature is like
that allocated to the monarchy, and his faults are excused as his exclusive right to rule
according to his own power. The figure of Victor on the other hand more thoroughly
deserves the condemnation of Burke and Hobbes, who would cast him as a dangerously
subversive element according to their theories of social order and the responsibilities of
the subject to the governing bodies over him.
This thesis shows not only that Hobbes’ Leviathan provides a valid political frame for
interpreting Frankenstein, it also offers a unique perspective that enriches our
understanding of Shelley’s most famous novel. This reading illustrates the importance of
tracing the lineage of inspirational material for a novel back further than its immediate
temporal context through to the founding epistemology, incorporating a level of
historicity to the point that an alternative and valid reading can even subvert the
commonly accepted interpretation. As well, the lineage of thought should be respected,
and the thinkers of antiquity be given their due, as Victor Frankenstein’s ancient
philosophers laid the groundwork that propelled him beyond the imaginations of those
who mocked them (30). The breadth of this examination has been a period of human
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progress in political, scientific, and moral development spanning nearly two hundred
years, bookended by human suffering and fear.
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